Good deal would require no enrichment capability for Tehran, full access to all sites - Alireza Jafarzadeh
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Alireza Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director of NCRI US Representative Office, author of the book, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis, was among experts addressing a panel session in Paris on June 12 on nuclear deal with the Iranian regime. He reiterated that a good deal was already out of the picture because a good deal would require no enrichment capability for Tehran and full access to all sites.
The event was organized by "Foundation for Middle Eastern Studies" (FEMO) and chaired by Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, former US Special Envoy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs. Other speakers included, Linda Chavez, former Assistant to the U.S. President for Public Liaison, Howard Dean, former Governor of Vermont and Chair of the US Democratic Party, Ken Blackwell, former U.S. ambassador to the UN Human Rights Commission, Olli Heinonen, former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Bruno Tertrais, senior fellow at the French Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), James Woolsey, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under President Clinton, Yves Thréard, Leader writer and columnist for the French daily Le Figaro, Frédéric Encel, Professor of international relations at the ESG Management School, Seminar Director at the French Institute of Geopolitics. Struan Stevenson, former president, European Parliament Delegation for Relations with Iraq.
Text of Jafarzadeh's remarks follows:
Now what were the red lines? There were three basically big red lines that Khamenei had directed the negotiating team to follow. A, we're not going to accept the no-enrichment, the zero-enrichment. That means whether dismantlement of any of the enrichment sites, or reducing the enrichment to zero. Second, no access to the secret sites, the military sites, that's basically where the secret sites are. No access to the experts and the officials who are associated with it. And third, they're not going to address what they call the PMD, the possible military dimensions, the past activities of the Iranian regime dealing with the weaponization. There are about a dozen, maybe even more, lingering questions about this that the IAEA has been pursuing for over a decade some of them. That they're not going to basically address that.
So with that in mind, look at the strategy of Tehran. Their strategy has been if we can convince the P5+1 to get all we want, we would sign the agreement yesterday because it certainly benefits them. If not, get whatever you can and then drag it. What does dragging do? Once the regime drags the talks they can avoid the consequences of a confrontation, they can avoid the consequences of abandoning their weaponization program. They can keep some level of hope among the population because as long as the talk goes there's some kind of a (led) on the population that they're thinking okay, maybe this issue will be resolved, the whole sanctions will be lifted and things will change. And then it basically puts the foreign policy of foreign countries, especially the P5+1 and maybe others, in basically put it on a pause.