Hezbollah: One year after the ceasefire with Israel – assessment, tensions and perspectives

By Maceo Ouitana*

Hezbollah, a central military and political actor in Lebanon, has been at the heart of the regional dynamics shaping the Middle East for over forty years. Founded in 1982 with the direct support of Iran and in response to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, it has evolved from a guerrilla militia into a political-military force integrated into Lebanese institutions, while maintaining complete military autonomy.

Last year, a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel ended a series of border clashes that threatened to escalate into open conflict. This truce, negotiated with the support of the UN and regional mediators, was intended to defuse tensions in southern Lebanon. But twelve months later, the power balance remains unchanged and internal political tensions have intensified around a key issue: the disarmament of Hezbollah.

To understand the current situation and its prospects, it is essential to revisit the history of this movement, analyze the trends observed since the ceasefire, and assess the impact of internal and external pressures.

At its origins: the Iranian influence

The Israeli occupation of Lebanon in June 1982, during Operation "Peace in Galilee," was the defining event that precipitated the creation of Hezbollah. Israel justified its invasion by the need to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from southern Lebanon, but the subsequent military occupation radicalized the Lebanese Shiite community, which had historically been marginalized within the country's sectarian political system.

At that time, the Islamic Republic of Iran, founded three years earlier, sought to export its revolution and establish itself as the leader of the anti-Western Islamist movement. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was directly training the first Lebanese Shiite cells at the time, seized the opportunity. With the logistical and diplomatic support of Hafez al-Assad's Syria, the IRGC established training camps in the Bekaa Valley, a strategic area under Syrian control, near the front lines with Israel.

The deployment of these Iranian cadres aimed to structure and provide military training to several existing small Shiite factions, including those originating from the Islamist Amal movement and religious groups affiliated with the Al-Mahdi Mosque. American analyst Augustus Richard Norton summarizes this approach in Hezbollah: A Short History: "Iran saw Lebanon as fertile ground for exporting its Islamic revolution and projecting its influence against Israel."

An imported and adapted ideology

From its inception, Hezbollah adopted the Iranian doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (absolute theocratic governance), which grants the Supreme Leader of the mullahs ultimate religious and political authority. This formal allegiance to the Supreme Leader—then Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—resulted in an organic link between the Lebanese movement and the Iranian security and ideological apparatus.

Hezbollah set itself three initial objectives:

To resist the Israeli occupation and liberate all Lebanese territory.

To export the Shiite Islamist model by influencing Lebanese society and beyond.

To combat Western influence in Lebanon, deemed incompatible with its political and religious agenda.

The first decade: learning through experience (1982–1992)

The 1980s were marked by a combination of military action, ideological consolidation, and the development of a sophisticated propaganda machine.

Spectacular attacks against Western forces: on October 23, 1983, two suicide bombings simultaneously struck the US Marine barracks and the French paratrooper headquarters in Beirut, killing 241 and 58 people respectively. Although Hezbollah never officially claimed responsibility for these attacks, several US and French reports directly attribute them to the group, with Iranian logistical support.

A war of attrition against the Israeli army: in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah fighters conduct ambushes, rocket attacks, and harassment operations against Israeli forces and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a militia allied with Israel. This strategy of attrition, inspired by Iranian guerrilla tactics, aims to make the occupation politically unsustainable for Israel.

An effective propaganda machine: from its inception, Hezbollah developed a media network—sermons in mosques, audio cassettes, and later television (Al-Manar)—to disseminate a message combining armed resistance with social justice. It emphasizes its role as a defender of the oppressed, not only against Israel, but also against corruption and injustice within Lebanon.

This decade shaped the movement'sDNA: a disciplined, Iran-backed politico-military organization, capable of combining armed action, social work, and communication strategies to consolidate its control over the Shia community and establish itself as a national and regional power.

Rise to Power: From "Resistance" to Political Influence

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 marked a major turning point in Hezbollah's history. For the first time since 1978, no Israeli soldiers officially occupied Lebanese territory (with the exception of the Shebaa Farms, which remain disputed by Beirut). The movement presented this event as its sole victory, arguing that armed resistance had achieved what diplomacy and the national army had failed to accomplish. This narrative resonated strongly within the Shia community and beyond, strengthening its prestige and internal legitimacy.

Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah consolidated its role as a politico-military force:

On the military front, it maintained and modernized its arsenal, with a network of fortified positions south of the Litani River.

On the social front, it strengthened its parallel institutions (hospitals, schools, charitable organizations) which provided services in areas often neglected by the state.

On the political front, it actively participated in parliamentary life, while refusing to seriously discuss disarmament.

The year 2006 marked another milestone. On July 12, a Hezbollah operation against an Israeli patrol on the border—during which two soldiers were captured—triggered a 33-day war. Israeli bombings severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure and caused more than 1,200 deaths on the Lebanese side (mostly civilians). Militarily, Hezbollah suffered significant material losses, but it managed to continue firing rockets until the last day of the conflict. For Israel, the objective of destroying Hezbollah's military capabilities and freeing its soldiers was a failure. The movement's secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, exploited this relative failure to proclaim a "divine victory" and further reinforce the image of "invincible resistance" among his supporters.

Alongside these symbolic successes, Hezbollah continued its integration into Lebanese institutions. Its entry into Parliament dates back to 1992, capitalizing on the post-civil war context and the opening of the political system to parties emerging from militias. Since then, the party has regularly participated in governments, holding ministerial portfolios and developing a network of cross-sectarian alliances, notably with the Amal movement (Shiite) and, later, with the Free Patriotic Movement (Christian).

However, this political integration has never led to disarmament. As Lebanese political scientist Amal Saad summarizes: "Hezbollah followed a dual strategy: engaging with the political system while maintaining the capacity to withdraw militarily if necessary."

In other words, Hezbollah plays both sides:

Institutional legitimacy: presence in Parliament, participation in governments, involvement in national decision-making.

Military autonomy: total control over its armed wing, refusal to place its forces under the command of the Lebanese army, preservation of its offensive and defensive capabilities.

This duality allows it to exert considerable influence on Lebanese politics while remaining an independent military actor, capable of directly confronting Israel or influencing regional power dynamics according to Tehran's needs.

The ceasefire with Israel: a freeze, not peace

2023 was marked by a series of border incidents in southern Lebanon: sporadic rocket fire, Israeli strikes against suspected Hezbollah positions, and limited Hezbollah counter-attacks. These exchanges, though localized, recalled, by their intensity, the possibility of an escalation into open war, as in 2006.

The ceasefire signed on November 27, 2024, is not the result of a typical de-escalation, but rather the consequence of an unprecedented defeat for Hezbollah. Since October 7, 2023, in solidarity with Gaza, Hezbollah had intensified its attacks against Israel, leading to the evacuation of tens of thousands of residents from northern Israel. In 2024, the Israeli response was massive: the successive elimination of almost the entire leadership and military command of Hezbollah, including the elite Radwan forces; the destruction of a large part of its arsenal during the infamous drone alert incident; and the assassination, one after the other, of Hassan Nasrallah and then his successor. This series of devastating blows shattered the backbone of the movement and decisively weakened Iranian influence in Lebanon.

Faced with this risk, several actors (the United States, France, Qatar, and the United Nations) engaged in discreet mediations. The objective was not to achieve lasting peace, but to defuse the immediate escalation. The result was a ceasefire concluded in the summer of 2023, presented as a minimal compromise.

Key points of the agreement:

Withdrawal of Hezbollah combat units north of the Litani River. This measure is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted after the 2006 war, but rarely respected until then.

Strengthening the role of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), tasked with monitoring the buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Its mandate was expanded, with increased patrols and improved cooperation with the Lebanese army.

Mutual commitment to avoid provocations: Israel agreed to limit aerial overflights and airstrikes on Lebanese territory, while Hezbollah promised not to launch new military operations across the border.

A limited but fragile de-escalation

For the UN, this was "a limited but vital de-escalation agreement to prevent an all-out war" (UNIFIL Report 2023). Indeed, the arrangement significantly reduced border incidents in the following months. Israel temporarily suspended some airstrikes, and Hezbollah redirected its activities toward consolidating its internal positions.

However, this agreement does not constitute a true peace, as it leaves unanswered the structural issues that fuel the conflict:

Hezbollah's arsenal, estimated at over 150,000 missiles and rockets, has been considerably reduced.

The regional rivalry between Iran and Israel.

The security vacuum in southern Lebanon, where the Lebanese army, despite symbolic reinforcements, remains under-equipped to truly control the area. In reality, the 2023 ceasefire is a tactical freeze: it halted the escalation without addressing its root causes. Hezbollah retained its freedom of movement north of the Litani River, and Israel maintained its deterrence posture. As Lebanese analyst Karim Bitar stated in an interview with L'Orient-Le Jour: "This ceasefire is a safety valve, not a solution. The roots of the problem—Hezbollah's military capabilities and regional interference—remain intact."

One Year of Truce: Trends and Developments

One year after the ceasefire was signed, Hezbollah's situation can be examined through three main dimensions: military, political, and social. Each of these areas illustrates both the movement's resilience and the vulnerabilities it faces in a Lebanon in crisis.

On the Military Front

On the military front, the truce did not lead to any real demobilization. On the contrary, Hezbollah took advantage of this relative lull to consolidate and modernize its security apparatus.

Arsenal: According to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF, 2024), Hezbollah maintains a stockpile of over 150,000 rockets and missiles, including several hundred precision-guided missiles. This arsenal, largely hidden in densely populated urban and rural areas, remains a major threat to Israel in the event of renewed hostilities.

Modernization: The organization has intensified its use of drones, not only for surveillance but also for short-range targeted strikes. Simultaneously, its communication systems have become more secure and sophisticated, reducing their vulnerability to interception.

Deployment: Hezbollah has discreetly reinforced its defensive positions, often camouflaged within civilian infrastructure, complicating any Israeli military intervention and increasing the risk of civilian casualties.

On the political front

Politically, Hezbollah continues to wield significant influence, but its image has been weakened by the deep crisis engulfing Lebanon.

Internal alliances: The movement retains the support of its traditional allies, notably Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which guarantees it considerable influence within the Lebanese political landscape.

Fluctuating popularity: However, Lebanon's severe economic crisis has eroded its appeal among certain segments of the population, particularly outside its Shiite stronghold. Criticism is growing regarding its military role and its impact on the institutional paralysis.

Strengthened opposition: The Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb Party are intensifying their pressure, making any national recovery contingent on Hezbollah's disarmament, which they view as an obstacle to sovereignty and reconstruction.

On the social front

Finally, on the social front, Hezbollah manages to maintain a loyal base thanks to its network of services, but it faces the challenge of dwindling financial resources.

Network of influence: Despite the crisis, Hezbollah continues to operate a vast network of social services—schools, hospitals, clinics, and food programs—which sustains the loyalty of its base.

Declining funding: The reduction in funding from Iran, which is facing economic sanctions and budgetary difficulties, has forced the movement to cut back on some aid. However, community solidarity and the perception of Hezbollah as a protector of the Shiite community ensure it strong support.

Social resilience: This loyalty rests as much on material assistance as on a deeply rooted sense of identity and ideology, which partly compensates for the frustrations stemming from deteriorating living conditions.

Disarmament: a national dividing line

The issue of Hezbollah's disarmament remains one of the most sensitive political and security debates in Lebanon, having been a point of contention for nearly two decades. At the heart of this controversy lie two major UN resolutions: Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) and Resolution 1701 (2006). The former demanded the end of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon and called for the dissolution of all armed militias, while the latter, adopted after the 2006 war, imposed a ceasefire with Israel and reaffirmed the need for a Lebanon free of armed groups outside its national army.

For the Lebanese government and part of the political establishment, these resolutions constitute the legal basis for a clear demand: to restore the state's monopoly on the use of force. They believe that the coexistence of a national army and a parallel armed organization undermines sovereignty and weakens the country's authority. According to them, only a state that controls its own weapons can claim to embody true independence and protect its borders.

Another argument put forward is the preservation of Lebanon as a sovereign entity, distinct from regional rivalries. The country's recent history, marked by foreign intervention and proxy wars, fuels the fear that Hezbollah's armed presence could transform Lebanon into merely a battleground between Iran, its main backer, and Israel. In this sense, disarmament is seen by some as a vital imperative to free the country from its chronic vulnerability and prevent its citizens from paying the price for conflicts beyond their control.

For its part, Hezbollah firmly opposes any attempt at disarmament. Its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, killed in an Israeli attack on Beirut on September 27, 2024, maintained that the movement's weapons are inseparable from national security. For him, military deterrence remains essential as long as Lebanon is exposed to the Israeli threat. Nasrallah has repeatedly emphasized that the Lebanese army, despite its commitment and professionalism, remains vastly outmatched by the Israeli military. Therefore, according to him, disarming Hezbollah would effectively mean disarming Lebanon itself and exposing the country to external aggression.

This divergence reflects a deep national divide. On one side, a segment of Lebanese society, often represented by political factions aligned with the West and the Gulf states, sees disarmament as a prerequisite for a modern and fully sovereign state. On the other side, a significant portion of the population, particularly within the Shia community, views Hezbollah as a vital bulwark that proved its effectiveness in 2000 during the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and again in 2006 against the Israeli offensive.

This debate on disarmament therefore illustrates not only a strategic disagreement, but also an identity and symbolic struggle over what Lebanon should be: a neutral state, sovereign over its own institutions, or a country that embraces its role as a "forward defense line" against Israel.

The Shadow of Iran

Hezbollah remains one of the central pillars of Iranian strategy in the Middle East. The organization acts as an extension of Tehran's regional power. Since its creation in the early 1980s, the Lebanese Shiite movement has been conceived as a tool for projecting Iranian influence beyond its borders. This relationship has solidified over the decades, to the point that the organization is now considered by many analysts to be a true "proxy army" of Iran in the Middle East.

The supply of weapons is a prime example. Through Syria, Iran established a logistical corridor allowing Hezbollah access to a sophisticated arsenal, including precision missiles, drones, and secure communication systems. This arrangement became particularly important after the Syrian civil war, with Damascus serving as a strategic hub for the transfer of military equipment, often under the supervision of the Quds Force, the external operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime ended the existence of this vital corridor.

Coordination between Hezbollah and the Quds Force goes beyond simply supplying weapons. The two entities cooperate closely in the planning and execution of military operations, whether targeted actions against Israel or broader deployments, such as in Syria, where Hezbollah sent thousands of fighters to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This involvement strengthened the movement's regional standing and consolidated Iran's position as an indispensable actor in the Syrian conflict.

Hezbollah's strategic alignment with Tehran's objectives is undeniable. Whether it's about countering American influence, containing Israel, or supporting allied regimes like that in Damascus, the Lebanese movement faithfully follows the regional vision of the Iranian clerics. This ideological and operational convergence makes Hezbollah not only a partner, but also a direct instrument of Iran's geopolitical ambitions.

As Karim Sadjadpour, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment, summarizes: "Hezbollah is not just an ally of Iran; it is an extension of its advanced defense apparatus." This statement reveals the symbiotic nature of the relationship: for Iran, Hezbollah constitutes an advanced defense line on the Israeli front, a kind of outsourced shield and sword. For Hezbollah, Iran is both its main financier, ideological mentor, and guarantor of its long-term survival.

This symbiotic relationship has transformed Hezbollah into a true Iranian outpost in the Levant. For Tehran, it represents an advanced defense line against Israel; for Hezbollah, Iran remains its financier, ideological mentor, and guarantor of its survival.

The Shiite factor as a geopolitical key

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Shiite Islam has been a major geopolitical lever for Iran in the Middle East. Khomeini, with his keen political awareness, placed this religious dimension at the heart of his regional strategy. From Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen, Shiite movements have been mobilized as instruments of influence. Lebanese Shiites, historically marginalized and often closer to Iran than to the Arab world, saw in Hezbollah a form of recognition and protection. Similarly, in Yemen, the Houthis, stemming from a Zaydi Shiite branch, played a key role in consolidating Iranian presence against Saudi Arabia. This centrality of Shiite Islam explains why the recent setbacks of Hezbollah constituted a direct blow to the Iranian axis in the region. Scenarios and Outlook

The future of Hezbollah and Lebanon remains deeply uncertain. In light of the dynamics observed since the ceasefire, several potential trajectories can be envisaged. Each scenario presents opportunities, but also serious risks, and largely depends on external factors—notably the stance of Iran, Israel, and other regional powers.

Scenario 1: Continued Status Quo

In this scenario, Hezbollah retains its entire military arsenal while avoiding provoking an open war with Israel. Its activities would be limited to occasional displays of force (symbolic deployments, bellicose rhetoric, indirect support for actions in Syria) without crossing the threshold of direct confrontation.

This status quo,which has been in place for several years, is based on a logic of mutual deterrence: Israel tolerates Hezbollah's armed presence as long as the group does not cross certain red lines, and Hezbollah justifies its weapons by citing the constant threat posed by Israel. This situation offers relative stability, but it is also inherently unstable, as a local incident can quickly escalate into a regional conflict.

Scenario 2: A negotiated partial disarmament

A second scenario, sometimes discussed by diplomats, would involve gradually integrating some of Hezbollah's fighters and structures into the Lebanese army, while maintaining a degree of political autonomy for the movement. This would allow Lebanon to strengthen its national army and give Hezbollah an "official" institutional role.

However, such a scenario is highly unlikely without strong regional guarantees. It would require:

Security assurances against Israel, in order to convince Hezbollah to reduce its arsenal.

Credible international mediation, likely under the auspices of the UN.

And, above all, a softening of Iranian influence, which sees Hezbollah as its strategic outpost.

Without these conditions, the prospect of partial disarmament remains more theoretical than realistic.

Scenario 3: Regional escalation

This scenario would see a resumption of open hostilities with Israel, triggered by a border incident. In this case, Lebanon would risk being dragged into a devastating war against its will.

Israel, concerned about Hezbollah's ballistic missile capabilities, could decide to launch a massive military campaign to neutralize its arsenals. For its part, Hezbollah would seek to impose high costs on Israel by saturating its missile defense system with thousands of rockets. Such an escalation would have catastrophic consequences for the Lebanese population and for the infrastructure already weakened by the economic crisis. Scenario 4: Political Reorientation

Finally, a fourth scenario would involve a gradual transformation of Hezbollah towards a primarily political and institutional role, at the expense of its military component. This would imply that the movement would prioritize its integration into the Lebanese political system and focus its efforts on its social base, its electorate, and its internal alliances.

This scenario would not necessarily entail complete disarmament, but rather a shift in strategic priorities: the military force would become secondary to the political power. However, such a development would presuppose a more stable regional context and a decrease in Hezbollah's dependence on Tehran, which seems unlikely at present.

A common thread across all scenarios: the centrality of Iran

Whatever path is taken, one constant remains: the end or limitation of Iranian interference is an essential condition for any lasting solution. As long as Hezbollah is perceived as Tehran's armed wing, its complete disarmament will remain unattainable, and Lebanon will continue to pay the price for this regional projection of power.

Conclusion

One year after the ceasefire, Hezbollah remains an over-armed military actor, an influential political force, and a symbol of resistance for some Lebanese, but also a factor of national division.

Any progress towards disarmament will depend on three key conditions:

Credible security guarantees for southern Lebanon.

Internal political consensus.

And, above all, a significant reduction in Iranian interference—a condition that many consider essential but difficult to achieve.

* Maceo Ouitana is a journalist and a contributor to FEMO