Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: A Decisive Vote for the Country's Political Future
Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: A Decisive Vote for the Country's Political Future
By the Editorial Staff - 11/19/2025
On November 11, 2025, Iraqis voted to renew the 329 seats in the House of Representatives. Despite a tense atmosphere (economic crisis, distrust of the political class, calls for a boycott launched by some citizen movements), voter turnout was surprisingly high. According to Le Monde, it was "strong," a sign that the population, despite its weariness, wanted to have a say in the country's institutional future.
The very next day, the list headed by outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Chia al-Soudani claimed victory, according to statements gathered by RFI and confirmed by his entourage in Le Monde. Even before the detailed results were published by the Independent High Election Commission (IHEC), one thing was clear: these elections would reshape the balance of power between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, and define the contours of the next governing coalition. In a country where political fragmentation mirrors social fragmentation, and where Parliament remains the arena for both partisan ambitions and regional influences, this election was of paramount importance. It was the first electoral test since the country's relative stabilization following the tensions of 2023-2024 and the endless debates on sovereignty, corruption, and the presence of armed militias.
The Election Process: High Turnout and Enhanced Surveillance
Contrary to pessimistic predictions, voter turnout was higher than in 2021. Despite a climate of political disillusionment, participation remained strong: official statistics indicate a rate of 55%, compared to 41% in 2021. This renewed interest can be explained by three factors:
● The desire to avoid the unchallenged dominance of a single Shiite bloc, as the Coordination Framework had hoped to consolidate its hold.
● The emphasis placed on local issues, particularly in Sunni and Kurdish provinces where reconstruction, public services, and security remain top priorities.
● The strengthened oversight of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which has increased controls to limit fraud and authorized the presence of international observers.
Unprecedented electoral monitoring
The Independent High Electoral Commission emphasized the rigor of the process:
● strict control of political advertising and the use of public resources;
● regulation of campaign spending;
● publication of quotas for minorities;
● facilitated access for national and international observers;
● 7,768 validated candidates, including 2,248 women.
This increased transparency addresses the crisis of confidence stemming from the previous elections, which were contested in the streets and accused of being manipulated by the parties with the strongest local presence.
A Relative Victory for al-Soudani in a Fractured Parliament
Outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Soudani claimed victory on November 12, the day after the parliamentary elections. His "Coalition for Reconstruction and Development" alliance came out on top with 46 seats, according to the Electoral Commission. A notable performance, but far from the 165 needed for an absolute majority. In the Iraqi system, governance relies on fragile coalitions, and negotiations are expected to be lengthy.
A More Fragmented Parliament Despite Increased Turnout
The election mobilized 55% of voters, compared to 41% in 2021, representing nearly 12 million voters out of 21.4 million registered. This rebound is significant, especially after the call for a boycott by Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr. But the parliamentary fragmentation confirms the trend toward governance by consensus, at the cost of protracted negotiations. Shiite blocs: recomposition and rivalries
The Shiite scene remains the political heart of the country, but it is divided into three poles:
- The Sadrist Movement: Still influential despite its official withdrawal, it retains a strong popular base in poor neighborhoods and an anti-corruption platform. Its candidates often run on independent lists.
● The Coordination Framework: Led by Nouri al-Maliki, it brings together the Fatah Alliance (Hadi al-Ameri), the Dawa Party, and pro-Iranian factions.
● Al-Soudani's Alliance: Positioned as a pragmatic compromise, neither Sadrist nor fully aligned with Tehran. This positioning explains its relative success.
Sunni Forces: Local Recomposition
In the West and North, two parties dominate:
● Taqaddam (Mohammed al-Halbousi): A modernist, non-sectarian party, based in Anbar and Nineveh (28 seats).
● Azm Alliance (Muthanna al-Samaraï and Khamis al-Khanjar): more traditional, supported by tribal networks.
Local and independent lists are making progress in areas affected by the Islamic State, where reconstruction remains a priority.
Kurdish parties: status quo and persistent rivalry
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the competition remains structured by:
● KDP (Massoud Barzani): dominant in Erbil and Dohuk (26 seats).
● PUK (Bafel Talabani): influential in Sulaimaniyah (15 seats).
● New Generation: a rising protest voice.
The KDP-PUK rivalry will determine their influence in Baghdad.
Major challenges to stability
Al-Soudani's victory opens a phase of negotiations where stability will depend on fragile compromises. The stakes are considerable:
● Formation of the government in a context of Shiite and Kurdish rivalries.
● Regional pressures between Iran and the United States.
● Addressing social expectations: the fight against corruption, unemployment, and failing infrastructure.
3. The profound stakes of the election: sovereignty, security, and governance
Beyond the numbers, the Iraqi parliamentary elections are a test of sovereignty. Iraq is still trying to loosen the grip of foreign influence. Iran, the United States, and Turkey remain key players, weighing heavily on the political balance. Parties close to Tehran hoped to consolidate their power in Parliament, while reformist groups, both Shiite and Sunni, sought to assert an autonomous Iraqi political identity. The Kurds, for their part, see these elections as leverage to preserve their budgets and internal prerogatives.
Social pressure inherited from the 2019-2020 protests
The demonstrations that shook the country five years ago left a lasting mark. Voters are demanding:
● A fight against corruption,
● Administrative reforms,
● Improved public services (electricity, water, health, infrastructure),
● Access to employment.
No party can ignore this pressure, even if the capacity for reform remains limited by internal rivalries and the logic of sectarian power-sharing.
Security challenges
Security remains a major issue:
● resurgence of sleeper cells of the Islamic State;
● tensions between Shiite militias;
● risks of confrontation between the KDP and PUK in Kurdistan;
● persistent influence of armed groups in certain provinces.
Voters also voted for stability.
4. Political Analysis: What These Elections Reveal
1. New Competition Within the Shiite Camp
Al-Sudani's rise is shifting the balance:
● The Sadrists remain indispensable;
● The Coordination Framework remains powerful but divided;
● Al-Sudani is positioning himself as a moderate, technocratic, and nationalist force.
This Shiite triangle will determine the formation of the government.
2. The Sunni Vote Becomes More Political and Less Tribal
Taqaddam's progress reflects:
● A desire for modernization;
● A vote less beholden to tribal leaders;
● A strong expectation of public services and reconstruction.
But the competition with Azm remains fierce.
3. Kurdistan Remains Divided but Strategic
The KDP and PUK, separately, can only exert influence if they negotiate together. Their fragmentation weakens their influence in Baghdad. Coalition Scenarios: Towards a Fragile Majority
Scenario 1: Coalition Around al-Soudani
The most likely scenario remains that of a coalition structured around Mohammed Chia al-Soudani. It would rely on his main alliance, on moderate Sunni parties like Taqaddam, as well as on the participation of the major Kurdish parties (KDP and PUK). This configuration, already tested during his previous term, would offer institutional continuity and an executive branch capable of functioning, even in a deeply fragmented landscape.
But this apparent stability masks a more complex reality. A coalition dominated by al-Soudani would be forced to adopt a balancing act with Iran. The challenge would not be to strengthen ties with Tehran, but rather to limit its influence without provoking escalation. For twenty years, Iranian interference, through militias, political pressure, and economic influence, has remained one of the main factors weakening Iraqi sovereignty. Al-Soudani would not be able to abruptly break with this reality, but could seek to gradually reduce the mullahs' scope of intervention, particularly in the security and energy sectors.
Such a coalition would, however, benefit from relatively broad parliamentary support, which would facilitate the adoption of urgent economic reforms. But it would also have to contend with several vulnerabilities:
● the residual opposition of the Coordination Framework, particularly from pro-Iranian factions hostile to any rebalancing;
● an impatient Iraqi society, after twenty years of systemic corruption and crumbling infrastructure;
● increasing international pressure to end the role of Shiite militias and to stabilize Baghdad's foreign policy.
Thus, even if it remains the most realistic scenario, a government built around al-Soudani would not guarantee lasting stability. It would instead open a delicate political battle to redefine Iraq's place between its own sovereign aspirations and the persistent, but contested, influence of Iran.
Scenario 2: A "Great Shiite Bloc": A Theoretical, but Unrealistic Hypothesis
Some observers regularly raise the possibility of a "unified Shiite front" bringing together the Coordination Framework and the Sadr movement. In theory, this scenario could create a numerically powerful majority, capable of forming a homogeneous government on paper. But in reality, it remains one of the most improbable scenarios on the Iraqi political scene.
The first obstacle is personal and political: Muqtada al-Sadr categorically rejects any alliance with Nouri al-Maliki, whom he accuses of being responsible for Iraq's institutional and security collapse in the 2010s. The ideological differences run deep: al-Sadr presents himself as a nationalist reformer hostile to corruption and foreign interference, while the Coordination Framework openly relies on the protection of the Iranian regime and the political-military networks it has established in Iraq.
A "unified Shiite bloc" would inevitably strengthen the authority of pro-Iranian militias and cement Tehran's grip on Baghdad's affairs. This would directly contradict the popular will expressed since 2019: an end to corruption, an end to foreign control, and an end to the impunity of the militias. For this reason, this scenario, even if it occasionally appears in speeches, is less a realistic option than a tool of political pressure used by certain actors.
In short, a "large Shiite bloc" would mean increased polarization, the marginalization of Sunnis and Kurds, and a return to the violent tensions of previous years. It therefore remains, in the current context, a theoretical hypothesis, but one incompatible with the actual evolution of Iraqi society.
Scenario 3 – Political Impasse and the Return of Instability
Iraq is no stranger to prolonged post-election crises.
Scenario 3 – Political Impasse and the Return of Instability
Iraq is no stranger to protracted post-election crises. If negotiations between the main blocs stall, a scenario of institutional deadlock could emerge. This is one of the major risks of the election, given the fragmentation of the political landscape and the persistent mistrust between Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish actors.
In this case, no stable coalition would be able to prevail, paving the way for a technically "provisional" but politically weak government. A technocratic cabinet could be reappointed, lacking clear electoral legitimacy and under constant pressure from armed factions, particularly those close to the Iranian regime, which traditionally take advantage of periods of power vacuum to strengthen their networks.
The absence of a prolonged political agreement could also lead to:
● a budgetary paralysis, at a time when the Iraqi economy needs swift decisions;
● Increased security tensions, particularly in areas where the state remains fragile;
● A resurgence of popular mobilizations, especially among young people who reject internal political compromises and Iranian interference.
This stalemate scenario would represent a direct threat to Iraqi sovereignty. Pro-Iranian militias would see it as an opportunity to regain ground lost in recent years, while Iraq's international partners—the United States, the UN, and its Arab neighbors—would become increasingly concerned about the risk of regional destabilization.
In other words, a fragmented and unstable government would not only be a political failure: it would represent a setback in the development of the Iraqi state, providing fertile ground for armed groups and foreign powers still seeking to influence the country's trajectory.
What these elections mean for Iraq's future
The November 11th election is not simply a redistribution of seats: it redefines the balance of power that will shape Iraq for years to come. The victory claimed by Mohammed Shia al-Soudani reflects a profound shift in public opinion. A large portion of voters chose pragmatic candidates, rejecting both the paralysis of Shiite sectarianism and foreign interference, first and foremost that of the Iranian regime, which is now being challenged even within its own ranks. The rejection of extremism, which began with the October 2019 uprising, is becoming a constant. Iraq is seeking less a middle ground than a national rebalancing, after years in which armed groups linked to Tehran imposed their agenda. The Independent High Election Commission (IHEC) emerges strengthened from this period. Its rigorous management (spending controls, propaganda monitoring, transparency of voter lists) has helped restore a degree of public trust. For the first time in several electoral cycles, a majority of Iraqis recognize their institutions' capacity to organize a credible election. This newfound legitimacy creates space for more ambitious reforms: an overhaul of the electoral law, strengthening of political parties, and increased transparency in financing.
Politically, a new map is emerging. The Shiite camp, while still the majority, is no longer monolithic: it is traversed by deep ideological divisions between nationalist reformers, factions dependent on Iran, and more moderate institutional blocs. Sunni forces, on the rise, appear less dispersed than before and are consolidating their influence in several provinces. As for the Kurds, despite persistent tensions between the KDP and the PUK, they remain essential to the formation of any lasting majority.
But it is in the area of security that the next government will have to confront the most sensitive challenges. The pro-Iranian militias, weakened since the 2024 US airstrikes and the fall of their strategic ally Hezbollah in 2024, no longer hold the same balance of power as before. Their future largely depends on the internal evolution of the Iranian regime: any major crisis in Tehran—economic, political, or social—would further reduce their capacity to act in Iraq. Baghdad will also have to manage the rivalries between Kurdish forces, accelerate the reconstruction of Sunni provinces, and continue the fight against the remaining ISIS cells in rural areas.
Without progress on these issues, stability will remain fragile. But if the government manages to meet these expectations, the upcoming legislative session could mark a turning point: that of an Iraqi state finally beginning to regain control over its institutions, its borders, and its future.
Conclusion: A Decisive Election but an Uncertain Transition
The parliamentary elections of November 11, 2025, represent a major political moment for Iraq. Despite calls for a boycott and widespread weariness with the political class, the high voter turnout expresses a fundamental truth: a large part of the population continues to see the ballot box as a possible instrument, perhaps the last, to regain control over the country's future.
The victory claimed by Mohammed Chia al-Soudani illustrates this need for stability but also a desire to rebalance the power dynamics within the Shiite camp. The new Parliament, more fragmented but more representative, reflects a political landscape where no single party can govern alone, where the Sunni and Kurdish blocs have once again become kingmakers, and where pro-Iranian factions no longer wield the decisive power they still exercised a few years ago.
But the most important task remains:
- the negotiation of the coalition, which will determine the internal balance of the future government;
- Redefining relations with Sunni and Kurdish parties;
- Managing a struggling economy despite oil revenues;
- And above all, the crucial issue of the militias, whose ambiguous status continues to undermine Iraqi sovereignty, while the weakening of Hezbollah and American pressure have weakened all Iranian proxies in the region.
These elections offer a real opportunity: that of a national refocusing, of a state that could finally regain the initiative and gradually free itself from the external influences that have paralyzed it. But this window remains narrow and precarious. Everything will depend on the ability of Iraqi leaders to transcend partisan, tribal, and regional loyalties to rebuild institutions capable of withstanding internal and external shocks.
Iraq faces a decisive choice. The November 11 election could be the first step toward lasting stability or the prelude to a new phase of deadlock. The coming months will tell whether political forces are ready to transform a massive vote into a genuine national project.