The Fragmentation of Shiite Militias in Iraq: Between Loyalty to Tehran and the Assertion of Iraqi Sovereignty
BY : *Franck Radjai
11/4/2025
Since the 2003 US invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has become a testing ground for the proliferation of Shiite militias. Born in the security vacuum left by the collapse of the national army, they initially presented themselves as forces protecting Shiite shrines and local communities. They quickly gained the support of Iran, which saw in this unstable environment an opportunity to project its influence in the heart of the Arab world.
The question is clear: are these militias still instruments of Iranian influence, or can Iraq hope for a rebalancing in favor of its national sovereignty?
The origins: the birth of Shiite militias in Iraq
The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, following the American invasion, disrupted the political and sectarian balance of Iraq. The Ba'athist army was dissolved by decree of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), depriving the country of any credible security force. In this security vacuum, the Shiite population, long marginalized by the Sunni regime, saw a window of opportunity for historic revenge.
Iran's Entry onto the Stage
Iran, which shares a border of more than 1,400 kilometers with Iraq, immediately seized this opportunity. Already involved since the 1980s in training Iraqi Shiite dissidents who had taken refuge in Tehran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activated its networks. Its objective was clear: to prevent post-Saddam Iraq from becoming an American stronghold on its doorstep, and instead to make it a space of strategic influence.
As early as 2003-2004, several armed groups benefited from direct financial, logistical, and military support from Iran:
● The Badr Organization, which emerged from the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI), formed in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). It returned to Iraq with thousands of experienced fighters.
● The Mahdi Army, created in 2003 by the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, draws its support from the poor Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad (notably Sadr City) and quickly mobilizes tens of thousands of followers.
● Smaller but highly specialized groups, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, formed through a split from the Mahdi Army and directly trained by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).
The United States then accused Tehran of supplying Explosive Precipitation Machines (EPMs) capable of penetrating the armor of American tanks, a technology that was used in attacks against the coalition as early as 2005.
The Najaf-Qom Rivalry
At the heart of this dynamic, an ideological divide emerged. The Grand Shiite Marja of Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, based in Najaf, advocates a nationalist approach. He insists on the need to build a sovereign state, free from submission to either Washington or Tehran. Conversely, some of the new militias subscribe to the Iranian doctrine of velayat-e-faqih (absolute theocratic governance), recognizing the religious and political authority of the Iranian Supreme Leader.
This tension, between an "Iraqi" vision of Shiism and a "transnational" vision aligned with Iran, thus structures the landscape of Shiite militias. As analyst Renad Mansour (Chatham House, 2018) summarizes: "Post-2003 Iraq has seen the emergence of two competing projects: a nationalist project centered on Najaf, and a transnational project directed from Qom and Tehran. The militias are the armed wing of this competition." The war against ISIS: a pivotal moment
The real turning point came in June 2014, when ISIS seized Mosul and threatened Baghdad. Faced with the collapse of the Iraqi army, Sistani issued a fatwa calling for general mobilization (al-jihad al-kafa'i) and urged citizens to defend the country and Shiite holy sites.
This call led to the creation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a coalition of Shiite militias theoretically under the authority of the Prime Minister, but in reality dominated by factions closest to Tehran.
In 2017, after the territorial defeat of ISIS, the PMF numbered approximately 150,000 fighters, according to the International Crisis Group.
In 2017, following the territorial defeat of ISIS, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) numbered approximately 150,000 fighters, according to the International Crisis Group. Their official budget, approved by the Iraqi Parliament, then amounted to nearly $2 billion annually, representing a considerable presence within the security apparatus.
An Ambiguous Legitimacy
The fight against ISIS granted the militias a new legitimacy. They are perceived as the saviors of the nation by a segment of the Shiite population. However, this legitimacy is accompanied by an ambiguity:
● The pro-Sistani militias (notably the Atabat Brigades, linked to the shrines of Najaf and Karbala) remain committed to a national agenda and accept a degree of state control.
● Until the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in 2024, pro-Iranian militias (Kataeb Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba) actively participated in the Syrian war, aligning their strategy with Tehran's priorities and consolidating their role as regional instruments of Iranian influence.
In short, post-Saddam Iraq has seen the emergence of a lasting paradox: militias that are both integrated into and rival the state, presented as defenders of the nation but used by Iran as regional levers.
A spectrum of heterogeneous militias
The world of Iraqi Shiite militias is far from uniform. Behind the generic name of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) lies a mosaic of armed groups with very different loyalties, ideologies, and structures. This internal diversity is one of the keys to understanding the current fragmentation and tensions between Iraqi sovereignty and Iranian influence.
The pro-Sistani militias: the nationalist anchor
The factions linked to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the supreme Shiite marja of Najaf, constitute a distinct pole within the PMF.
● These groups, often called the Atabat Brigades, are dependent on the Shiite shrines of Najaf and Karbala.
● Their guiding principle is clear: to defend Iraq and its holy sites, without becoming involved in regional projects directed by Tehran.
● Their allegiance lies with the Iraqi state, which they consider the sole legitimate holder of sovereignty.
Their role was decisive against ISIS, but they have gradually distanced themselves from the pro-Iranian militias, refusing to participate in operations in Syria or attack American targets. For many Iraqis, these brigades embody a form of military patriotism, distinct from Iran's transnational agenda.
Pro-Iranian militias: Tehran's armed wing
Conversely, the most powerful factions of the PMF remain fully aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran. They share an ideology inspired by the velayat-e-faqih (Islamic jurist doctrine) and define themselves as the spearhead of the "axis of resistance," which also includes Lebanese Hezbollah and the Yemeni Houthis.
Among them:
● Kataeb Hezbollah: considered the most loyal to Tehran, directly trained and financed by the Revolutionary Guard. Accused by Washington of carrying out attacks against American bases in Iraq and Syria.
● Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH): formed from a split within the Mahdi Army in 2006, and currently led by Qais al-Khazali. Known for its involvement in Syria and its financial ties to Iran.
● Harakat al-Nujaba: founded in 2013 by Akram al-Kaabi, active in both Iraq and Syria, often cited as a direct military proxy for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
● Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada: emerged in 2013 and was deployed from its inception to fight in Syria alongside the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
These groups possess sophisticated military structures, as well as economic networks (control of border crossings, smuggling, private businesses). Their influence extends far beyond security matters.
Hybrid Militias: Between Pragmatism and Ambiguity
Between these two poles, some factions maintain an ambivalent position. They promote an Iraqi nationalist discourse but continue to benefit from Iranian support. Their survival often depends on a balance between regional loyalty and local legitimacy.
This is the case with the Imam Ali Brigades, led by Shibl al-Zaidi, a former close associate of Muqtada al-Sadr. Officially integrated into the PMF, they are accused by Washington of having served as a financial conduit for Qassem Soleimani, former commander of the Quds Force.
An Accepted Fragmentation
This diversity creates a structural fragmentation within the PMF:
● Pro-Sistani groups want all forces brought back under state authority.
● Pro-Iran groups assert their autonomy and justify their existence through "resistance" to Israel and the United States.
● Hybrid groups oscillate between the two logics to maximize their survival.
This heterogeneity complicates any attempt at reform or dissolution. As analyst Michael Knights (Washington Institute, 2021) explains: "The PMF are not a unified organization, but a federation of rival groups with divergent allegiances. This ambiguity serves Iran, which can operate through multiple channels, but weakens the Iraqi state."
Organic Ties with Tehran
The strength of Iraqi Shiite militias cannot be understood without examining their close relationship with Iran. Since 2003, Tehran has methodically invested in training, financing, and structuring these groups, transforming them into veritable proxies serving its regional interests.
The Historical Role of the Pasdaran and Qassem Soleimani
At the heart of this system is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran), and more specifically its branch specializing in external operations, the Quds Force. Led until his assassination in January 2020 by Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force played a central role in building the networks linking Tehran to Baghdad, Najaf, and Basra.
Soleimani maintained close personal relationships with many militia commanders. His influence extended far beyond military logistics: he coordinated funding, oversaw operations, and served as a political mediator between factions. As analyst Ali Alfoneh (Arab Gulf States Institute, 2020) noted, "Soleimani was the de facto Iranian minister in Iraq."
Flows of Arms and Funding
For two decades, pro-Iranian Iraqi militias have benefited from a continuous supply of sophisticated weaponry:
● Short-range ballistic missiles (Fateh-110, Zelzal), smuggled across the border.
● Armed and surveillance drones, already used to strike US bases and oil infrastructure.
● Secure communication systems, enabling transnational coordination.
Financially, Iran has mobilized several channels, ranging from clandestine bank transfers to control of entire economic sectors (border crossings, illegal fuel trade, semi-public companies). According to a 2021 US Treasury report, Shiite militias generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually through these parallel channels. Transnational Relays: Hezbollah as a Model
The links are not limited to a one-way flow between Tehran and Baghdad. The Lebanese Hezbollah has often served as a relay and organizational model for Iraqi militias. Iraqi commanders have been sent to Lebanon for military and political training. Conversely, Hezbollah officers have been dispatched to Iraq to oversee the use of new weapons. This cooperation illustrates the integration of Hezbollah and Iraqi militias into a single "axis of resistance," conceived by Iran to project its power from the Mediterranean to the Gulf.
The Fall of the Syrian Regime: A Strategic Turning Point
The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in 2024 profoundly altered the balance of power in the region. Until then, Syria had been the linchpin of the Iranian network linking Tehran to the Mediterranean, via Baghdad and Beirut. For Iraqi Shiite militias, this corridor represented both a logistical route and a space for ideological legitimation, justified by the defense of the "resistance front."
With the collapse of the Alawite regime, this network crumbled. The Revolutionary Guards lost a crucial link in their chain of influence, and the Iraqi militias affiliated with Tehran saw their regional role diminish. Deprived of their base of operations in Syria, they retreated to Iraqi territory, intensifying internal competition for control of resources and power.
This development marks a turning point: for the first time since 2014, pro-Iranian militias appear more as local actors than as conduits for a transnational revolutionary project. The vacuum left by Damascus forced Tehran to reorganize its priorities, and Iraq, long peripheral, has once again become the center of gravity of the Iranian presence in the Levant.
The American perception
For Washington, these groups are not simply Iraqi actors, but direct extensions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). On September 17, 2025, the State Department designated Al-Nujaba, Ansar al-Sharia, Kataeb Imam Ali, and Sayyid al-Shuhada as foreign terrorist organizations. In its statement, it asserts:
"The Iranian regime supports the Al-Nujaba movement both militarily and logistically, and this group maintains close ties with Qassem Soleimani, former commander of the IRGC-affiliated Quds Force, and Hassan Nasrallah, former leader of Hezbollah." The statement adds that Shibl al-Zaidi, head of the Imam Ali Brigades, acted as a financial coordinator between the Quds Force and several militias. He thus facilitated Iraqi investments on behalf of Soleimani.
Dependence but also room for autonomy
While Iran's influence is undeniable, not all militias simply obey Tehran blindly. Some retain a degree of autonomy, driven by local rivalries, economic ambitions, or the desire to secure Iraqi legitimacy. But in times of regional crisis, whether clashes with Israel or tensions with Washington, Iran remains the center of gravity.
Internal divisions: between loyalty and sovereignty
While Iraqi Shiite militias may appear from the outside as a homogeneous bloc supported by Iran, the reality is far more nuanced. They are crisscrossed by deep fault lines that pit two competing visions of Iraq's future against each other: national integration and transnational loyalty.
The challenge of state control
This ideological divergence takes on a political dimension. Successive Iraqi governments, from Haider al-Abadi to Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, have attempted to strengthen state authority over the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). But the results remain limited.
● Pro-Sistani factions advocate for the full integration of the militias into the regular army and the end of parallel command structures.
● Pro-Iran factions, on the other hand, oppose any attempt at dissolution, arguing that their weapons are necessary to resist Israel and the United States.
This duality prevents the emergence of a coherent security strategy. As Renad Mansour (Chatham House, 2022) notes: "The Iraqi state does not own the militias; the militias own the state."
Fragmentation is also the product of personal rivalries and struggles for economic control. Pro-Iranian militias are vying for control of border crossings, public contracts, and areas of influence in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul.
In 2021, armed clashes erupted between Kataib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq in Baghdad, fueled by financial rivalries. More recently, in 2023–2024, the Atabat Brigades publicly denounced the use of PMFs (Public Military Forces) by certain groups to attack US bases. They explicitly accused these actions of jeopardizing national stability.
Popular Pressure
Since the large-scale demonstrations of October 2019, the Shiite public has increasingly and openly expressed its rejection of Iranian influence. In Baghdad and Basra, protesters have set fire to the headquarters of pro-Iranian militias, which they accuse of corruption and bloody repression.
These movements reflect a social divide: a segment of Shiite youth identifies neither with Najaf nor Qom, but aspires to a modern state, free from foreign influence and militia patronage.
A Functional Fragmentation
Ultimately, the fragmentation of the Shiite militias can be summarized as follows:
● A nationalist pole, anchored in Najaf, which aims for integration into the state.
● A transnational pole, anchored in Qom and Tehran, which asserts its role in the "axis of resistance."
● A gray area of hybrid factions, oscillating between the two logics according to political and economic opportunities.
This fragmentation, far from being a weakness, sometimes constitutes a strength for Tehran, which can operate on several fronts simultaneously. However, it structurally weakens the Iraqi state, rendering it incapable of exercising sovereign authority over its own armed forces.
The 2025 Challenge: American Designation and Reorganization
The year 2024 marked a turning point for the pro-Iranian militias operating in Iraq and Syria. In January, a drone attack carried out by Iraqi factions affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeted an American base in Jordan, killing three American soldiers. In retaliation, Washington launched a series of massive strikes against militia positions in Iraq and Syria, notably targeting the infrastructure of Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataeb Hezbollah.
These operations profoundly shook the pro-Iranian paramilitary networks and forced Tehran to order a suspension of all direct attacks against American forces. This tactical retreat, dictated by the fear of a direct confrontation with the United States, marked the end of a phase of regional offensive activity and the beginning of a period of strategic caution for the Iranian regime.
Reactions in Baghdad
This decision puts the Iraqi authorities in an uncomfortable position. Washington remains a key partner for army training and economic support, but part of the government remains closely tied to pro-Iranian militias, whose political influence is real. The American designation thus exacerbates divisions: those close to Najaf see it as an opportunity to reduce Tehran's influence, while pro-Iranian factions denounce it as yet another instance of American "interference."
Consequences for the Targeted Militias
The targeted groups immediately suffer concrete consequences: their assets abroad are frozen, their leaders face travel restrictions, and they face increased difficulties in maintaining funding channels. Their image in Iraq is also damaged. Accusations of collusion with Tehran fuel criticism from those who believe that these militias are not defending Iraq but rather prolonging regional conflicts on its soil.
However, this type of sanction can also strengthen their dependence on Iran, which remains an essential supplier of money, weapons, and political protection.
A realignment underway
Within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the American decision is accelerating a realignment that was already underway. Brigades close to Najaf are more openly demanding that the state regain full control of security, while pro-Iranian factions are adopting a narrative of victimhood and calling for unity in the face of what they describe as an attack against "the resistance." In between, some hybrid militias are seeking to distance themselves from Tehran to avoid suffering the same fate.
These strikes have also revealed the structural vulnerability of Iran's network of allies in the Levant. After the heavy losses suffered by Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2024, Iraqi Shiite militias have lost some of their military and political credibility. Under pressure from both Washington and neighboring Arab governments, Iran has gradually reduced its operational and financial support to its proxies, preferring to preserve its internal resources.
This relative disengagement has ushered in a new cycle of fragility: for the first time since 2014, several Iraqi Shiite militias are considering their survival not as dependent on a regional axis, but on local adaptation to the Iraqi political scene. The researcher Hisham al-Hashimi, assassinated in 2020 but whose analyses continue to circulate, had already summarized this dynamic: "The question is not whether the militias will disappear, but how they will adapt to the pressures exerted upon them."
Iraq faces the dilemma of sovereignty.
For more than twenty years, Iraq has been trying to rebuild a sovereign state, but the presence and power of the Shiite militias complicate this project at every stage. Officially integrated into the security apparatus since the creation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in 2014, they remain largely beyond the effective control of the government. This duality—militias that are both legal and autonomous—illustrates the chronic weakness of a state struggling to impose its authority. Successive governments have expressed a desire to reform the security sector. Haider al-Abadi attempted to place the PMF under the authority of the Prime Minister. Mustafa al-Kadhimi, in 2020, promised a "reassertion of control" and ordered targeted arrests of certain commanders. But each attempt has run up against reality: the most powerful militias possess not only heavy weapons but also political connections in Parliament and within the administrative apparatus. Any direct confrontation risks triggering an open crisis in the heart of Baghdad.
Beyond their military capabilities, the militias have built considerable economic power. They control several border crossings, particularly with Iran and Syria, collect illegal taxes, invest in local businesses, and profit from a vast fuel smuggling network. These resources give them financial autonomy, further reducing the state's ability to weaken them.
The Shiite population itself is divided. Some continue to see the militias as an essential bulwark against external threats, especially Israel and the United States. But others, particularly among younger generations, accuse them of corruption, violence against protesters, and serving Tehran more than Iraq. The large-scale popular mobilizations of 2019 had already revealed this rejection, when protesters in Baghdad and Basra attacked the headquarters of several pro-Iranian groups.
The dilemma is therefore clear: how can a sovereign state be built if part of its armed forces escapes its authority and aligns itself with foreign agendas? For many observers, the answer lies in internal restructuring: strengthening the factions close to Najaf, which advocate for a national identity, and gradually reducing the influence of groups linked to Qom and Tehran. But this transition can only succeed with consistent international support and, above all, strong political will in Baghdad—two elements that are currently lacking.
Iraq thus finds itself at a crossroads. Either it manages to assert its independence and prioritize the rule of law over the rule of arms, or it remains trapped in a fragmentation that exposes it to all kinds of external interference.
Perspectives and scenarios
The future of Shiite militias in Iraq now hinges on several possible paths, each with significant implications for the country's stability and the regional balance. One scenario is the status quo. The militias would continue to exist under the banner of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), officially linked to the state but effectively autonomous. Their arsenal would remain intact, their economic influence consolidated, and their political weight ensured by parliamentary alliances. This status quo, already in place for several years, guarantees a minimal form of stability, but at the cost of diminished sovereignty and a constant risk of escalation in the event of a regional crisis.
A second scenario, often mentioned by the Iraqi authorities, is that of partial disarmament. In this scenario, some brigades would accept gradual integration into the regular army, while others would retain their weapons under the pretext of "resistance." But this option requires regional guarantees, particularly from Iran and the United States. Without a broad political agreement, it is difficult to imagine the pro-Iranian militias voluntarily relinquishing what constitutes the core of their power.
The risk of escalation cannot be ruled out either. A new confrontation between Washington and Tehran, a security crisis in Syria, or a conflict with Israel could be enough to reignite the Iraqi front. In that case, the militias would once again become instruments of regional power projection for Iran, to the detriment of any internal stability.
Finally, some analysts envision a scenario of political reorientation. In this scenario, the militias would seek to transform their military capital into institutional capital, gradually reducing their armed profile to consolidate their influence within the state. This model would be reminiscent of that of Lebanese Hezbollah, which combines a military apparatus with political representation. But this option presupposes internal restructuring and a minimal consensus within Iraqi Shiite society, which remains hypothetical.
In the short term, none of these paths seems likely. Iraq remains caught between the need to preserve a fragile internal balance and the constant pressure of regional rivalries. The Decisive Iranian Factor
The future fate of Iraqi Shiite militias will depend closely on the political and economic evolution of the Iranian regime. The decisions of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the Revolutionary Guards remain central to the structuring and financing of these groups. Should Iran experience further internal uprisings, a weakening of its economy, or a succession crisis at the head of the regime, its ability to maintain armed proxies beyond its borders would be severely compromised.
In this scenario, Iraqi militias, already weakened by recent military setbacks and American pressure, could lose their main logistical and political support. Some would then turn to local alliances, while others would disappear due to a lack of resources. Conversely, if the Iranian regime manages to stabilize its domestic position, it will likely seek to rebuild a regional apparatus, albeit a more discreet one, based on deterrence and political influence rather than armed confrontation. The fragmentation of Shiite militias, far from disappearing, could well remain a structuring element of Iraqi political life for years to come.
Conclusion: The trajectory of Shiite militias in Iraq illustrates the complexity of a country struggling to overcome the contradictions inherited from the post-2003 era. Born in the chaos of Saddam Hussein's fall, they initially embodied the revenge of a long-marginalized majority. The war against ISIS subsequently granted them national legitimacy, presenting them as the nation's shields. But their role has gradually expanded, extending beyond Iraq's borders to serve Iran's regional interests.
Today, these groups have become both indispensable actors and major obstacles to state consolidation. Their partial integration into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) has not been enough to erase the fault lines. Militias close to Najaf continue to advocate for Iraqi sovereignty free from foreign interference, while those aligned with Tehran define themselves as a link in the "axis of resistance," with a loyalty that transcends national borders. Between these two poles, hybrid factions seek to survive by exploiting ambiguities. The American designation of September 2025 served as a reminder of how these groups remain at the heart of tensions between Washington and Tehran. It has weakened some of them, but has not resolved the fundamental question: how to reintegrate powerful armed forces, with their economic and political interests, into a state that has not yet fully regained its sovereignty?
The future will depend as much on internal choices in Baghdad as on regional developments. As long as Iran and the United States wage a proxy war on Iraqi soil, the militias will retain a decisive role. Iraq thus remains faced with a formidable equation: assert its independence and rebuild a strong state, or continue to suffer a fragmentation that exposes it to all kinds of external interference. At stake in this dilemma are not only the country's political future, but also a part of the balance of power in the Middle East.
*Franck Radjai is a Research Director at the CNRS and an analyst at FEMO