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Water Crisis in Iran

Khalil Khani *

Part One: Drought in Iran

Imagine standing beside a massive dam—not watching leisure boats gliding across the water, but instead seeing motorcyclists riding over its dry, cracked bed. This isn't a scene from a dystopian film or a figment of imagination; it is the grim reality of today's dams around Tehran.

The drop in rainfall across many provinces is deeply concerning Ilam has seen a 126 mm reduction, Kermanshah 79 mm, West Azerbaijan 72 mm, and Kurdistan 71 mm—all below their long-term averages. Provinces like Tehran, Isfahan, Razavi Khorasan, Hormozgan, and Markazi are also categorized as being in critical water stress zones.

In Hormozgan, an unprecedented drought is unfolding. The province's dams hold enough water for only one or two more months. On a national scale, dam reserves have declined by 5% compared to last year, and precipitation is down 42% from the long-term average.

At least eight provinces are experiencing rainfall reductions of over 50%. All signs point to a dry, crisis-laden summer ahead.

Part Two: Iran—A Dry Land in Crisis and Mismanagement

Iran is a vast country, with about 90% of its land lying in arid or semi-arid climate zones. Repeated droughts, unchecked population growth, and decades of unregulated development have pushed the country's water scarcity to a critical threshold.

To these, we must add climate change, rampant mismanagement of water resources, and over-extraction of groundwater—all of which have compounded Iran's political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.

Historically, Iranians engineered ingenious water solutions, such as the qanat system, to cope with scarcity. But today, long-term, science-based planning has been replaced by outdated and ineffective mechanisms.

Water management in Iran is not merely an environmental issue—it is inseparably tied to political, economic, and social dynamics. Iran is a land of contradictions: sudden floods on the one hand, and chronic droughts on the other. The country's crumbling water governance structure has transformed a natural challenge into a self-inflicted, systemic crisis.

While officials often cite drought and international sanctions as the primary causes, the truth lies in decades of poor planning, shortsighted policies, and the absence of scientific water governance. To this day, no meaningful long- or short-term strategy has been effectively implemented.

Part Three: The Critical State of Tehran's Dams

Water levels in Tehran's dams have dropped so severely that, in some areas, their dry beds are fully exposed—used by motorcyclists as makeshift tracks. This alarming image symbolizes the capital's deepening water crisis.

According to official data, total water volume in Tehran's five main dams has declined by 30% compared to the five-year average. Latian Dam currently holds only 25 million cubic meters (34% capacity), Lar Dam 24 million (3%), and Mamloo Dam 34 million (14%). Only Taleghan Dam is in relatively better condition, with 239 million cubic meters (54% capacity).

Karaj Dam, which is vital to Tehran's drinking water supply, holds just 15 million cubic meters—only 8% of its full capacity. This figure sounds a serious alarm for the capital's immediate water future.

Ali Shariat, Secretary General of the Water Industry Federation, stated in an interview with Entekhab News (March 11) that four of Tehran's five major dams are effectively out of service, making water rationing inevitable.

Deputy Minister of Energy, Mousavi Khonsari, warned on March 9 that water is now the most pressing threat facing Tehran. Unlike traffic or air pollution, he noted, the water crisis cannot be easily resolved or deferred.

With over 15 to 20 million people directly reliant on these resources, the water crisis in Tehran—as well as in cities like Qom and Isfahan—has entered an unprecedented and dangerous phase.

Part Four: A Prolonged and Intensifying Drought

Since the late 1990s, the Iranian Plateau has been in the grip of a prolonged and severe drought. Southern, eastern, and central provinces—especially Kerman, Sistan and Baluchestan, Khorasan, and Yazd—have been among the hardest hit. The drought persisted and worsened throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

Climate data shows that, over the past three decades, many regions in Iran have experienced both reduced rainfall and rising average annual temperatures. But the crisis isn't just about less rain. It is also driven by deforestation, loss of vegetation, soil erosion, and advancing desertification.

For years, Iran has battled dwindling water reserves and escalating climate stress. Yet this year, the situation is more dire than ever: national rainfall is roughly 50% below historical averages, placing enormous strain on already insufficient water supplies.

At least 12 provinces are now experiencing a 50–91% drop in rainfall. The result is a critical threat to drinking water access, agriculture, and the very foundations of economic sustainability.

Here is the fully revised and polished version of your Part Five: Structural Causes of Iran's Water Crisis, with improvements to tone, clarity, structure, and fluidity, while preserving your original meaning:

Part Five: Structural Causes of Iran's Water Crisis

1. Excessive Water Use in Agriculture
More than 80 to 90 percent of Iran's water resources are consumed by agriculture—primarily through outdated and inefficient irrigation methods. The low efficiency of these systems leads to vast water wastage across the country. In many regions, cropping patterns are poorly matched to local climates and water availability. Water-intensive crops such as rice, watermelon, and sugarcane are cultivated in areas already suffering from drought.
According to Iran's Chamber of Commerce, watermelon production alone causes an annual economic loss of $7 billion, while offering minimal added value. Although modern irrigation techniques could cut agricultural water use by up to 40%, the Islamic Republic has resisted reform under the banner of agricultural self-sufficiency. The result: degradation of water resources and worsening livelihood crises for farmers.

2. Industrial Dependence on Freshwater and Neglect of Wastewater Reuse
Major industries—such as Mobarakeh Steel in Isfahan, petrochemical plants, and nuclear facilities—are among Iran's largest freshwater consumers. Rather than utilizing treated wastewater, these industries continue extracting water from critical natural sources like the Zayandeh Rud River.
In Isfahan, instead of investing in municipal wastewater recycling systems, industrial facilities persist in diverting freshwater—contributing to the river's depletion and triggering widespread farmer protests. Despite the potential for large-scale wastewater treatment, investments remain limited and fragmented.

3. Inefficiency in Wastewater Recycling
In many water-scarce countries, recycling urban and industrial wastewater is central to sustainable water supply strategies. It reduces demand on freshwater sources and lowers the cost of supplying water to industries and green spaces.
Yet in Iran, this vital resource remains underutilized. Wastewater reuse exists only in a handful of cities and industrial hubs, without any national policy or integrated planning. In the absence of a comprehensive approach, valuable opportunities are continually squandered.

4. Unchecked Dam Construction and Environmental Degradation
Over the past four decades, Iran has built more than 640 dams—often without proper environmental impact assessments. Among them, 520 are large dams that have disrupted river ecosystems, dried wetlands, and contributed to widespread land subsidence.
A notorious example is the Gotvand Dam, built atop salt beds, which has turned the Karun River's freshwater into brine. The construction of 14 dams on the Karkheh River has completely dried it up, while 40 dams on the Karun have driven Khuzestan into a state of chronic drought.
Despite these ecological disasters, Khatam-al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) plans to build another 50 dams. These projects often serve the financial interests of powerful institutions, while the environmental and social costs are borne by ordinary citizens and ecosystems.

5. Lack of Spatial and Environmental Planning
The absence of regional planning that aligns land use with water availability has worsened the crisis. Water-intensive industries such as steel and petrochemicals have been located in dry and central provinces like Yazd and Isfahan.
These decisions have disrupted fragile ecosystems and necessitated long-distance inter-provincial water transfers. Such transfers are not only costly but also spark environmental degradation, forced displacement, and growing social unrest.
A stark example is the IRGC's oil operations in the Hour al-Azim wetland, now facing ecological collapse. Meanwhile, population growth policies that disregard environmental limits have added further pressure to already stressed water systems.

6. Overextraction of Groundwater
Lack of scientific water management has led to uncontrolled extraction from underground aquifers—creating a major crisis.
Widespread drilling of deep wells without oversight has caused groundwater levels to plummet, drying up wetlands, eroding soil, and intensifying land subsidence. On average, Iran's land surface sinks by one millimeter per day.
Each year, nearly 30,000 people suffer health impacts due to dust storms caused by desiccated soils. This phenomenon has rightly been called a "ticking time bomb" beneath the feet of millions.

7. Land Subsidence: A Hidden but Growing Disaster
Land subsidence is a gradual, often imperceptible process—but its consequences are severe. The main driver is groundwater depletion, which compresses soil layers and leads to structural collapse.
Of Iran's 609 plains, 422 are categorized as "restricted" or "critically restricted," and 359 are currently experiencing active subsidence.
In cities like Tehran and Isfahan, this has resulted in damage to buildings, roads, bridges, and utility networks. In agricultural zones, it reduces soil fertility and eliminates the land's ability to retain water—effectively turning farmland barren.

8. Interprovincial Water Transfers
Large-scale water transfer projects—from southern to central provinces—have proven financially burdensome, politically contentious, and ecologically damaging.
According to Ali Shariat of the Water Industry Federation, transporting one cubic meter of water across distances of 600 to 1,400 kilometers costs between $4 and $6.
These projects rarely resolve water scarcity. Instead, they merely relocate the crisis, fueling new tensions between provinces and ethnic communities.

9. Weak Regional Water Diplomacy
Iran shares numerous transboundary rivers with neighboring countries. Yet the Islamic Republic has failed to assert effective water diplomacy.
The Taliban has restricted the Helmand River's flow, drying up Lake Hamoun. Russia has reduced flow into the Caspian Sea by limiting the Volga. Turkey's dam-building spree on the Tigris and Euphrates has sharply curtailed water supplies to western Iran.
Despite these threats, Iran has neither applied diplomatic pressure nor pursued binding regional water agreements. This diplomatic void has allowed the domestic water crisis to evolve into a regional environmental emergency.

Part Six: The Water Crisis as a National Security Threat

Iran's water crisis has evolved beyond an environmental or economic concern—it now constitutes a full-blown national security threat.

Ali Shariat has warned that not only the summer, but even the coming spring, will be critical for many provinces. Reza Hajikarim, head of the Water Industry Federation, has stated that 65% of Iran's population lives under conditions of "water poverty." Environmental expert Mohammad Darvish has described the situation—marked by a 150 billion cubic meter water deficit—as a case of "hydrological bankruptcy" and a stark reflection of the country's mounting ecological debt.

In the absence of adequate water supplies, a domino effect of crises begins to unfold:

  • Agricultural unemployment
  • Climate-induced migration
  • Soaring food prices
  • Deepening poverty
  • Expansion of urban slums
  • And ultimately, mass protests

Iran has already witnessed early signs of this trajectory. The water protests in Khuzestan (summer 2021) and the farmers' demonstrations over the Zayandeh Rud in Isfahan are recent examples of environmental grievances that rapidly morphed into broader political unrest.

In such a scenario, traditional tools of repression—like internet shutdowns and police crackdowns—become increasingly ineffective. When people are fighting for survival, they no longer have anything to lose.

Part Seven: Final Conclusion

Denial and State Misinformation

Iran's water crisis has become so severe that even senior government officials have been forced to acknowledge its catastrophic scale. Yet in dealing with the public, the state continues to rely on denial, scapegoating, and the fabrication of external enemies.

In this inverted narrative, the crisis is blamed on abstract causes—such as population growth or foreign conspiracies—while systemic mismanagement and institutional failure are conspicuously absent from the discourse.

For example, the Deputy Minister for Water Resources Planning has cited "special circumstances" and demographic pressures as root causes, offering no mention of flawed policies or governmental inaction.

Former Agriculture Minister and head of the Environmental Protection Organization, Issa Kalantari, once warned that if current rates of groundwater depletion persist, Iran—home to a 7,000-year-old civilization—could become uninhabitable within two decades. His blunt assessment: "We've destroyed Iran."

Yet despite such warnings, the government continues to evade responsibility. Rather than reckoning with the scale of the crisis, it clings to defensive propaganda and refuses to acknowledge its role in exacerbating the disaster.

The drivers explored throughout this article—climate change, over-extraction, policy failure, corruption, and diplomatic weakness—have collectively pushed Iran to the edge of "water bankruptcy."

Still, the Islamic Republic shifts blame to the public or to neighboring countries, while powerful institutions such as the IRGC, foundations tied to the Supreme Leader's office, and Astan Quds have directly contributed to the worsening crisis.

Through wasteful infrastructure projects, reckless dam construction, and regional expansionism, these entities have not only depleted the country's water reserves, but also diverted billions in national wealth toward proxy militias and elite networks.

Yet a Path Forward Exists:

  • Scientific management of water resources
  • Expansion of wastewater recycling
  • Reform of agricultural practices and cropping patterns
  • Comprehensive spatial land-use planning
  • Deployment of modern, water-efficient technologies

Countries like Israel have demonstrated that sustainable water management is achievable—even in hyper-arid climates.

Unfortunately, in Iran, euphemisms such as "supply-demand imbalance" serve only to obscure the uncomfortable truth: the current crisis is the result of chronic administrative failure and the elevation of security concerns over public welfare.

If this trajectory continues unchecked, Iran will not only lose its environment and natural resources, but will also plunge into a storm of social, economic, and political unrest—a crisis that may ultimately consume the very regime responsible for it.

*Dr. Khalil Khani is an environmental expert. He holds a PhD in ecology, botany, and environmental studies from Germany, and has taught at the University of Tehran and the State University of Hesse in Germany. He also holds a doctorate in medical psychology from the United States.