Economic modernization and popular sovereignty: a critical analysis of the Rise Iran program from the perspective of a democratic transition in Iran

Sarah Pugliese, editor for FEMO

The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, amid escalating military tensions involving the United States, Israel, and several regional actors, marks a historic turning point for the Islamic Republic of Iran. For more than three decades, the Supreme Leader embodied the ideological and institutional architecture of the regime. His death is not just a change in leadership; it opens a period of major political uncertainty that is likely to redefine internal power relations and regional balances.

In this unprecedented context, the question of Iran's transition is no longer a theoretical projection, but a concrete strategic hypothesis. Several political projects are now vying for the definition of the "after." Among them, the program promoted by Reza Pahlavi emphasizes an ambitious economic reconstruction based on the market economy, monetary discipline, the restitution of assets to people and Iran's reintegration into the global economy. Presented as an "Iran Prosperity Project," this initiative promises rapid growth, a significant drop in unemployment, and accelerated technological modernization.

However, in a context of geopolitical restructuring and a power vacuum, the central issue cannot be solely economic. A sustainable transition depends above all on democratic legitimacy, popular sovereignty, and the

existence of a political organization capable of embodying the will of the Iranian people. Can economic modernization precede democratic structuring? Can a program developed mainly from outside the country form the basis of a truly representative regime ?

This is what we will attempt to analyze in this article.

Introduction :

An economically coherent but conditional doctrine

The Rise Iran program is clearly rooted in a liberal institutional tradition. It is based on the idea that national prosperity stems from economic freedom, legal security of property rights, and macroeconomic discipline.

In a country where the economy is largely controlled by religious foundations and parastatal entities linked to militarized power structures, the proposal to return semi-governmental assets "to the people" constitutes a break with principle. It implies massive privatization or supervised redistribution aimed at dismantling institutionalized rents. In theory, such a measure could promote competition, increase productivity, and stimulate private investment.

The independence of a central bank also appears to be a key element of the plan. Iran suffers from chronic inflation fueled by budget deficits and structural monetary financing. An independent monetary authority could restore the credibility of the financial system, stabilize the national currency, and attract capital.

Iran's reintegration into international financial networks is the other pillar of the project. Access to global banking systems, the normalization of transactions, and openness to foreign direct investment are presented as levers for accelerating growth and reducing unemployment. The promise of a significant increase in GDP implicitly relies on the lifting of sanctions and a rapid return of international financial flows.

The emphasis on women's participation in the labor market

and on human capital also reflects an understanding of modern development dynamics. Iran has a highly educated population, a significant portion of which remains economically underutilized. Removing structural barriers to women's participation could generate a substantial multiplier effect.

Thus, from a doctrinal standpoint, the program is undeniably consistent. It identifies real dysfunctions and proposes solutions that comply with international economic governance standards.

However, this consistency is based on major preconditions: political stability, the lifting of sanctions, institutional transformation, and the dismantling of economic networks linked to the ruling power. Without these preconditions, the proposed architecture remains theoretical.

Furthermore, the promise of a growth rate of up to 10% is one of the most spectacular elements of this program. Such a figure suggests a phase of expansion comparable to those observed in certain emerging economies during periods of rapid catch-up or following a major positive shock, such as a massive lifting of sanctions or a sudden opening up to international capital.

However, double-digit growth depends on strict macroeconomic conditions. It requires not only the complete lifting of sanctions, but also immediate political stability, a massive influx of foreign direct investment, rapid restructuring of the banking system, and an effective administrative capacity to absorb these financial flows without causing imbalances.

However, post-authoritarian transitions are historically marked by a phase of institutional uncertainty. International investors generally wait for legal and political consolidation before committing significant capital. High growth could be possible in the short term due to a catch-up effect after the lifting of sanctions, but maintaining it over the long term would require deep structural reforms and stable governance. The rapid decline in unemployment poses a similar problem. The Iranian labor market is affected by a mismatch between academic training and productive structure, heavy dependence on sanctioned sectors, and a significant informal economy. Massive job creation requires a stable entrepreneurial environment, labor law reform, and a clear regulatory framework.

Furthermore, the history of economic transitions shows that an initial phase of restructuring can, paradoxically, lead to a temporary rise in unemployment before stabilization. The liberalization and privatization of inefficient sectors often lead to difficult social adjustments.

Thus, projections of 10% growth and rapid reduction in unemployment appear conditional on a combination of political, institutional, and geopolitical factors, the simultaneous realization of which remains uncertain.

This observation is not intended to invalidate Iran's growth potential, a country with considerable energy resources and skilled human capital, but to emphasize that economic prosperity depends on a controlled political sequence and strong democratic institutions. Without internal legitimacy and a stable institutional framework, macroeconomic promises are likely to be more motivational rhetoric than realistic projections.

Lack of internal organizational anchoring: a deficit of democratic legitimacy

The transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system is not limited to the implementation of economic reforms. It requires the existence of an organized political force capable of representing, coordinating, and channeling the will of the people within the country.

One of the most problematic aspects of this program is its essentially exogenous nature. It is a vision developed mainly outside Iranian territory and intended to be implemented after a change of regime. However, the history of political transitions shows that sustainable processes rely on internal structures capable of articulating popular mobilization.

Examples of successful transitions in Central Europe and Latin America show that democratization has been supported by structured organizations with internal networks, a militant base, and negotiating capacity. Popular sovereignty cannot be decreed; it is built through institutions and organized movements. No matter how detailed an economic program may be, it cannot replace structured political representation. The absence of a clearly identified internal organization capable of carrying out this project within Iran therefore raises a fundamental question of legitimacy. A transition based primarily on an exiled figure, without a clear institutional mechanism for consultation and popular representation, risks appearing disconnected from internal social dynamics.

Democracy requires not only free elections, but also institutional pluralism and an organizational capacity to defend the interests of citizens. Without these elements, economic modernization could precede, or even bypass, political democratization. Moreover, this dimension becomes more crucial in a post-Khamenei context

marked by internal competition for power. A credible political transition would require structured representation capable of avoiding an institutional vacuum or the hijacking of the process by new centers of power.

Economic modernization and democratic transformation: a risk of dissociation

The Supreme Leader's passing comes at a time of profound regional instability. Tensions involving the United States, Israel, and rivalries with Saudi Arabia are redrawing strategic alliances and increasing pressure on Iran. In this context, the promise of rapid modernization based on the lifting of sanctions depends on geopolitical factors that are largely external to the economic program alone. International recognition of a new Iranian leadership will depend on its democratic credibility and its ability to stabilize the country.

The discourse of "modernism" promoted by the "Stand Up Iran" program highlights powerful symbols: state-of-the-art hospitals, futuristic infrastructure, global banking integration, and massive investment in emerging technologies. This rhetoric aims to project the image of a reintegrated, prosperous, and innovative Iran. However, contemporary history shows that economic modernization and political democratization are not necessarily correlated. States can achieve high economic performance while maintaining centralized political structures.

True democratic transformation involves the separation of powers, judicial independence, freedom of political organization, protection of fundamental rights, and institutional transparency. However, this program remains relatively vague on the specific mechanisms of institutional consolidation.

The restitution of assets to the people, for example, requires a rigorous legal framework to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a new elite. Without strong democratic institutions, economic redistribution may simply change the configuration of power centers without transforming their nature.

Furthermore, the program's dependence on the lifting of sanctions and international recognition introduces a significant external dimension. A sustainable transition must above all be based on internal legitimacy.

International recognition generally stems from previously established democratic credibility, not the other way around.

Thus, the main risk lies in a disconnect between the promised economic modernization and effective democratic consolidation.

Conclusion

Reza Pahlavi's economic program offers an ambitious vision of modernization based on the principles of a market economy, institutional discipline, and international openness. Doctrinally, it is consistent and identifies real structural obstacles facing Iran.

However, the central issue remains that of popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. A sustainable transition cannot be based solely on an economic project; it requires a structured internal organization capable of embodying and representing the will of the Iranian people.

Economic prosperity, while a legitimate goal, cannot precede or replace the building of strong democratic institutions.

Ultimately, Iran's political future will depend less on the sophistication of an economic program than on the ability to establish a truly representative, pluralistic regime based on the effective participation of citizens.