Iran in Crisis: Assessing the Potential for Change and the Third Option, June 2025

The following analysis, published by the Free Iran Scholars Network (FSIN), a think tank of Iranian academics, examines the potential for change in Iran from the opposition.

Written by Dr. Ramesh Sepehrrad (author, researcher, and cybersecurity expert) and Dr. Kazem Kazerounian (professor and specialist in Iranian politics), this original and highly relevant analysis seemed to us to be of particular interest.

The first version was published under the title:

Iran Engulfed in Crisis: Assessing the Potential for Change and the Third Option.

Therefore, we are offering a French adaptation for FEMO.

Introduction: A Narrative Constructed According to the Regime's Talking Points

In the context of the current Iranian crisis, which has now taken on global dimensions, Iran's future and the prospects for change have become topics of discussion in the media.

Let's take a step back. Faced with the regime's relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons, its destructive regional interference, and its support for terrorism, the political dilemma of Western countries was, for years, presented as a binary choice: appeasement to induce a change in behavior, or war.

Of course, for more than four decades, the choice fell on dialogue and negotiation with the regime in power, fueled by the vain hope of discovering "moderates" within its ranks and encouraging it to change its behavior.

It is clear that this approach has failed and is completely discredited. Few still defend it today.

The recent conflict is further proof that the prevailing policy toward Tehran leads only to war. But the outcome of this conflict also demonstrates that external military intervention cannot resolve the threats posed by this regime.

Twenty-one years ago, at the height of the debate between appeasement and war, Ms. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), rejected both options, warning that appeasement would inevitably lead to war. She proposed a third way: rejecting both appeasement and war, in favor of regime change by the Iranian people and their organized resistance.

Immediately after the recent ceasefire, the President-elect of the Iranian Resistance emphasized:

"The ceasefire and the end of the war represent a step forward for the third way: neither war nor appeasement." Let the Iranian people themselves, in the battle for their destiny, overthrow Khamenei and the religious dictatorship. The Iranian people, in their century-long struggle, at the cost of enormous sacrifices, have repeatedly rejected the dictatorships of the Shah and the mullahs through successive uprisings.

It is clear that the prospects for change in Iran are more tangible than ever. This is why the mullahs' regime, along with the think tanks, analysts, and lobbyists it has placed in media and institutional circles in the West, are conducting a coordinated campaign to promote two narratives based on illusory, even delusional, notions:

1. The "invincibility" of the Islamic Republic, claiming that the opposition cannot bring about its downfall. The absence of an uprising during the Twelve-Day War is presented as proof of the regime's internal stability.

2. Regime change in Iran would trigger chaos and anarchy, as happened in Iraq and Libya, fracturing the country, sparking civil war, and causing waves of refugees.

The concrete consequence of these assumptions is the denial of the existence of a genuine alternative to the regime. Thus, pragmatism and realpolitik, they argue, dictate that the West should continue its efforts to appease and engage in dialogue with Tehran, rather than with the organized opposition. Consequently, the "third way"—regime change by the people and organized resistance—is presented as mere rhetoric, devoid of any practical substance. Yet, a careful examination of Iran and the region reveals a very different reality.

A. A Millennial Civilization

Unlike most countries in the region—born after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, shaped by the direct intervention of colonial powers (notably Great Britain and France) and the drawing of artificial borders—Iran, heir to a millennia-old civilization, possesses a deeply rooted and independent identity. It is neither the product of the "pen of the colonial ruler" nor the result of the imperial disintegration of the Ottoman Caliphate; on the contrary, it has consistently preserved its coherent identity and national structure throughout history. Even in its most difficult moments, Iran has never become an official colony.

Neither foreign invasions nor radical upheavals have succeeded in undermining this national unity. Neither the Mongol offensives, nor the Arab invasions, nor the Allied occupation during World War II, nor the direct political and military interventions of Russia and Great Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries succeeded in fragmenting or dismantling the national structure of this country.

Unlike some countries in the region whose social and religious structures fuel crises stemming from the tribal composition of their society, cleaved by sectarian and ethnic affiliations, such as Libya or Iraq, Iran's ethnic and religious diversity has always been integrated into a strong national fabric.

Indeed, by exporting Islamic fundamentalism, creating and supporting proxies, and fomenting ethnic and religious discord, it is the regime of the Supreme Leader that has played the role of "incendiary," fueling instability, violence, and crisis in the region. The disappearance of this regime, by the will of the Iranian people, would eliminate a major source of unrest, thus laying the foundations for lasting peace and coexistence in the region.

The various ethnic groups in Iran, including the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, and Baloch, have preserved their national identities and have always considered themselves inseparable from the Iranian nation—a fundamentally different reality from that of their counterparts in neighboring countries. In Iran, ethnic and national solidarity is central: Iranian Kurds, unlike those in Iraq or Turkey, are not tempted by separatism. Azerbaijanis have not only been an integral part of the nation but have also governed Iran for 300 of the last 400 years. The Supreme Leader of the current regime is of Azerbaijani origin. Azerbaijanis represent a significant portion of the opposition movements; for example, two of the three founders of the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) in 1965 were Azerbaijani.

Religiously, while 80 to 90% of Iranians are Shiite, religious minorities—Sunnis, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Baha'is—have, for the most part, coexisted peacefully alongside the majority, with the exception of the current period. Iran has never experienced internal war or disintegration, and no part of the country has ever seceded as a result of ethnic or religious conflict. The separation of territories like the Caucasus or parts of present-day Afghanistan from Iran is the result of foreign invasions. This deeply rooted historical, social, and cultural context renders all scenarios, Libyan, Iraqi, or even Syrian, unfounded.

B. Internal Erosion and Regional Strategic Setbacks: Toward a Point of No Return

In the current situation, the regime's political and religious legitimacy has virtually eroded. Even among its traditional pillars, such as certain segments of the clergy and the merchant class of the Bazaar, the regime now faces a profound crisis of legitimacy. The gap between the people and the state is wider and more visible than ever.

Economically, the regime is in a complete deadlock. Rampant inflation, unemployment, endemic corruption, and international sanctions have crippled the regime's economic infrastructure and plunged ordinary Iranians into a deep crisis. These conditions have fueled the expansion of protests and demonstrations.

Severe erosion is eating away at the regime and its security apparatus. There is a crisis of loyalty, and growing cracks are appearing within it. Its repressive forces are suffering from exhaustion, while external pressures and repeated regional setbacks have made the regime more vulnerable than ever. These factors are pushing the system toward a point of no return.

Regionally, the regime has suffered irreparable strategic setbacks. The weakening and eventual loss of its main proxy force, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the military attacks against the Houthis in Yemen, the increasing pressure on Tehran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq, and, above all, the fall of Bashar al-Assad, a pillar of the regime's regional strategy, have contributed to dismantling what the regime once considered its "strategic depth" and political shield. All these developments have brought the regime closer to irreversible collapse.

C. The Social Factor: The Objective Preconditions for Revolution

Since late 2017, Iran has experienced several major national uprisings, demonstrating a widespread desire for regime change. The 2017-2018 protests, during which the population chanted "Reformers, conservatives, the game is over!", reflected the shattering of illusions about change from within the system.

The November 2019 uprising marked the descent of Iran's working class into the streets, shattering the myth of regime support among the poor. After a bloody crackdown that left

1,500 dead, the rebellious youth retaliated, setting fire to more than 900 government and security centers, according to official figures.

The 2022 uprising, which lasted several months across the country, marked, under the leadership of women, the end of forty years of repression.

Iranian youth are the driving force behind this movement: a generation born mostly after the 1979 revolution, who, despite decades of regime propaganda and cultural indoctrination, have no emotional or ideological ties to this power and see their own future in fundamental change.

In recent years, social movements focused on economic demands have proliferated. During the Iranian year 1403 (March 21, 2024 to March 21, 2025), at least 3,092 protests were recorded, led by at least 17 professional groups – teachers, students, farmers, truck drivers, bakers, pensioners, nurses, market vendors, and others.

The widespread participation of women and youth at the forefront of the protests, as seen in 2022, testifies once again to society's desire for total change, even revolution. On the one hand, the regime has exhausted all its strategic resources and cannot solve any of society's problems; on the other, the population has reached a breaking point and refuses to tolerate the status quo any longer. However, these volatile conditions alone do not guarantee regime change: only the presence of an organized, determined, and dedicated force on the ground can transform this potential into a genuine revolution.

D. Organized Force on the Ground

This force is embodied by the composition of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), and resistance units throughout the country.

Unlike other countries often cited as examples of deadlock, Iran stands out due to the existence of a long-standing, structured, and firmly established resistance movement. Its strengths lie in the fact that the resistance organization, the PMOI, possesses a vast network in Iran, the credibility of six decades of struggle, and heavy sacrifices against two dictatorships. Furthermore, the NCRI's political coalition is the most enduring (44 years) in Iranian history. These resistance formations play a central and irreplaceable role in any prospect of change.

These capabilities are often ignored by the general public, obscured, or underestimated by ill-informed commentators. Yet the Iranian Resistance possesses considerable strengths that give it the capacity to both overthrow the regime and establish a democratic alternative. Here are some of these elements:

1. Intellectual, political, and cultural influence: The antithesis of Islamist extremism, the MEK promotes a tolerant and democratic Islam that advocates the separation of religion and state and entrusts leadership positions to women. Furthermore, the emblematic presence of a woman at the head of the Resistance represents a powerful social lever, providing a novel response to the cultural dilemma of a predominantly Muslim society subjected to a fundamentalist regime. For 46 years, the Iranian people have endured the manipulation of their religious beliefs by a power they reject. They aspire to preserve their spiritual identity while freeing themselves from the grip of a theocratic regime that confiscates their freedom.

2. The Strength of a Vast Network of Committed Activists and Leaders:

A generation of seasoned activists and leaders is driving this movement forward with remarkable cohesion, making the Iranian Resistance the only force capable of simultaneously taking initiatives both domestically and internationally. The movement's leaders and supporters embody unwavering moral strength and commitment in the face of adversity, ready to pay any price for Iran's freedom.

3. Political Capacity:

The NCRI is distinguished by its transparent, realistic, and modern political vision for a democratic future. The outlines of its program are laid out in Maryam Rajavi's Ten-Point Plan, which proposes a concrete model for a secular and pluralistic republic based on universal suffrage, gender equality, freedom of expression and assembly, and the separation of religion and state. The NCRI roadmap also guarantees the rights of all ethnic and religious minorities, the abolition of the death penalty, an independent judiciary, and a foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence. Rooted in decades of struggle and organizational experience, this comprehensive framework not only addresses the immediate needs of Iran's diverse society but also provides a solid foundation for stability, justice, and democratic governance in the post-theocratic era.

4. Ashraf-3:

One of the MEK's major assets is Ashraf-3, located in Albania, home to nearly 3,000 of its members; a structured, dense, and experienced core group in all aspects of the struggle against the regime. Over the years, this resistance group has overcome numerous obstacles and accumulated invaluable expertise. Ashraf-3, with its thousand former political prisoners and thousand pioneering women, is today a powerful source of inspiration for Iranian youth and women and stands as a guarantor of a peaceful transfer of power to the Iranian people for the country's future.

5. Resistance Units and MEK Structures in Iran

In 2024, the resistance units, the MEK's fighting arm in Iran, conducted 3,077 operations targeting bases of the IRGC, the Basij militia, and other repressive centers of the regime. Furthermore, more than 39,000 acts of courageous and symbolic defiance were committed across Iran: burning regime emblems, displaying and projecting images of resistance leaders onto pedestrian bridges and high-rise buildings, and writing slogans and graffiti in public spaces. These actions not only demonstrate the growing boldness and influence of the Resistance, but have also left the regime psychologically weakened and security exhausted.

Deeply embedded in Iranian society, the resistance units, drawing on their intelligence networks and organizational prowess, are well-positioned to initiate, organize, and lead uprisings at the decisive moment. They also play a vital role in protecting demonstrations and ensuring their effective management.

Despite arrests, severe repression, and death sentences handed down to their members, the resistance units have managed to preserve the integrity of their structure and even expand their ranks. They have not only experienced continuous horizontal growth, spreading throughout the country, but also vertical growth, strengthening their organization and, through close coordination, enabling ever-larger and more impactful actions.

While the resistance units are at the forefront of the movement within the country, the broader social network of the MEK, including families of fallen resistance fighters, prisoners, and people from all walks of life, plays a major role in social protests.

Another key asset is the MEK's intelligence network, which has provided access to the regime's most closely guarded secrets. The discovery of nuclear, terrorist, and other sensitive information over the past two decades is a direct result of this sophisticated network.

E. The Resistance's International Stance

On the international stage, the Iranian Resistance—and Maryam Rajavi's Ten-Point Plan—has enjoyed unprecedented support. More than 4,000 legislators in Europe and the Americas, including majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives and 34 parliaments worldwide, 137 former world leaders, and 80 Nobel laureates have officially endorsed the Ten-Point Plan and the Third Way, calling for recognition of the right of resistance units to confront the IRGC and the regime's repressive organs. The Ten-Point Plan, focused on the separation of religion and state, freedom of expression, gender equality, free elections, the abolition of the death penalty, minority rights, and a nuclear-free Iran, has become the foundation of international solidarity.

F. The Recent War and the Viability of the Third Way

The recent war between Israel and the Iranian regime has demonstrated once again that, despite the regime's serious setbacks, bombings cannot overthrow it. The only real solution remains the Third Way: change by the people and organized resistance. The irrefutable reality, confirmed by 46 years of experience, is that the Iranian people demand change, and that peace, stability, and tranquility in the region require change in Iran. Neither complacency nor war has proven capable of reforming or replacing the regime. Only organized resistance, supported by the people, offers a credible, concrete, and legitimate path to change. This path requires neither military intervention, nor external funding or armaments; it rests solely on the Iranian people and a resistance whose authenticity, capacity, and legitimacy have been proven over the past 46 years.

This recent conflict has only further revealed the utter failure of the Shah's son and the monarchists, who naively based their hopes for regime change on foreign intervention, fantasizing that such intervention would precipitate the regime's downfall and pave the way for their triumphant return to Iran. Today, deeply disillusioned, their demands appear hollow, and their fabricated "alternatives" are utterly ineffective in the face of emerging realities. They lack a social base, a credible program, an organizational structure, and genuine leadership. In reality, public opinion and society as a whole are turning to the organized resistance and its leaders, seeing them as the only viable path.

It is no coincidence that all the regime's top officials, including Khamenei himself, now speak with palpable fear and growing concern about the increasing influence of the MEK, Ashraf's decisive role, and the actions of the resistance units. They repeatedly emphasize that these forces constitute an existential threat to the very survival of the regime. This is why the theocracy has concentrated the full power of its intelligence, surveillance, and repressive apparatus within its own territory—and its plots and terrorist attacks abroad—against the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the MEK, and the resistance units.

Conclusion

Contrary to the regime's propaganda and the narratives fabricated by its lobbies, the third way—regime change by the people and their organized resistance—is not only conceivable, but also necessary and legitimate. It is the only path to national integrity, freedom, democracy, and the restoration of peace and security in Iran and the region. The growing wave of protests, the demonstrated capabilities of the resistance units, the exceptional international support, and the unity of the Resistance's leadership and program constitute the Iranian people's greatest national assets and their hope for the future.