The Reza Pahlavi Project

The Reza Pahlavi Project

- The Powers Devolved to the "Leader of the Uprising"

By Isabelle Prat

3/24/2026

Commentators rightly point out that the appointment powers granted to the Shah's son, in his capacity as leader of the uprising, are decisive within the three institutions of the Transition:

The National Uprising Council, which serves as the legislative body, is ostensibly distinct from the consultative National Uprising Council that existed before the fall of the regime (and which, it is assumed, includes the names of undisclosed opponents to protect their safety).

The Transitional Government, which serves as the executive body (also ostensibly distinct from the temporary leadership team that existed before the fall of the regime).

The Transitional Council, which serves as the judicial body.

Each of these Transitional institutions will have a director appointed by an absolute majority of the members of the National Uprising Council and with the approval of the leader of the uprising.

This constitutes a double validation of the names from among individuals not subject, at this stage, to any Iranian vote.

Only To be clear, some of the nominees may already be chosen from both inside and outside Iran—which is consistent with the demand for the release of political prisoners made at the press conference of January 17, 2026, regarding the National Revolution in Iran.

"Fifth, demand the immediate release of all political prisoners."

This model of appointment is applied to the ministers of the provisional government and their responsibilities.

I believe it is important to clarify that when Free France established its institutions, the Consultative Assembly itself was not created until September 17, 1943.

"To ensure, as accurately as possible, the representation of the true majority of French people, four categories of members were delegated to the Consultative Assembly: representatives of the Resistance in metropolitan France, representatives of the Resistance outside metropolitan France, representatives of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and representatives of the general councils of the territories of Free France (Algeria and overseas territories)." Their number changed over the course of the sessions. The ordinance of December 6, 1943, increased it from 84 to 102 delegates. The lists and registers drawn up according to the minutes of this Assembly [1] record deaths, validations, and invalidations, which make it difficult to determine the number of delegates present [2] in Algiers until July 1944. After the transfer of the Provisional Government of the French Republic to Paris, the number of delegates and the composition of the Consultative Assembly were significantly altered. By ordinance of October 11, 1944, the number of delegates [3] increased to 248; they began their sessions on November 7, 1944.

The ordinance of June 22, 1945, added a fifth category of members, reserved for prisoners and deportees returning from Germany: 47 members were appointed in July.

They served only briefly, as the provisional assembly dissolved on the evening of August 3, 1945, to make way for the institutional process of electing constituent deputies. The assembly then had 295 members.[4]

It was preceded by a Council for the Defense of the Empire, established by the leader of the French who wished to continue the war (a title bestowed by Churchill) from June to August 1940, officially recognized on October 27, 1940, and officially recognized as a government-in-exile on January 6, 1941.

The National Council of the Resistance (CNR), established on May 27, 1943, was the body that directed and coordinated the various movements of the French Resistance during the Second World War, encompassing all political leanings.

Composed of representatives from the eight resistance movements, the two major pre-war trade unions, and six political parties opposed to the Vichy government, it was established by Jean Moulin at the request of General de Gaulle, then head of the Free French government in London. Its first clandestine meeting was held on May 27, 1943, in a Paris apartment, chaired by Jean Moulin.

In short, there is not necessarily a fault in not including an electoral mechanism to ensure the representativeness of these initial organizational elements of the transitional phase.

It is the responsibility of the Council of the Uprising, on the one hand, to ensure the inclusion of opponents from organizations not registered with or aligned with the Shah's project. This, in my view, presupposes a mutual recognition of their existence.

In the absence of such a phase, tensions are predictable and undesirable regarding

Rebuilding democracy in the country

The debate risks focusing exclusively on the referendum campaign concerning

The choice of the system of government, with less visibility for entities absent from the

Council

Furthermore:

/ The regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran has, in whole or in part, emptied political parties of their substance (see the level of distrust Iranians have towards the parties in power)

/ Since elections for existing parties and unions in Iran (or even outside Iran) cannot be organized secretly in prison, nor remotely under conditions of sufficient democratic security

/ Since the potential list of parties and unions that existed before the fall of the regime, and/or were created after its fall, cannot be determined before the referendum process is launched, and the criteria for recognizing these parties and movements—assuming such criteria are defined—are not yet established. The exclusion of organizations (new constitution not adopted) is possible unless one considers that the hybrid rule of law (see next page) offers a pre-existing, consensual, and sufficiently essential foundation[1].

The only certainty compared to the past—the passive past, in this case the Shah's regime—is the existence of a plurality of parties, movements, and actors in the referendum campaign process.

But a real initial difficulty, in my view, lies in the fact that no mechanism, no body, is in place to resolve any disagreement regarding the appointment of the proposed director.

Worse, the lack of a mechanism suggests that a conflict of personality or direction is not being considered, which reinforces the presumption that the leader of the uprising has a decisive voice over everything.

The transition is supposed to allow, within four months, for a referendum to be held on the choice between two systems of government: "namely, a democratic monarchy or a democratic republic."

Choice of a hybrid legal framework

The question posed is when is the opportune moment for a radical overhaul of Iranian law?

The transition period has been rightly considered inappropriate, as this reflection should be left to the elected parliament.

The draft and the white paper therefore recommend a so-called hybrid option.

"42. The hybrid option combines maintaining existing laws with repealing specific laws that symbolize the Islamic Republic or hinder the success of the transition system."

43. The laws and legal provisions to be repealed should be selected based on the slogan that symbolized the modern Iranian revolution: Woman, Life, Freedom | Man, Homeland, Prosperity. (see next page)

Laws and legal provisions that openly contradict these values ​​should be repealed as a priority.

The recommendation previously ruled out reinstating imperial laws (which have become obsolete or are unlikely to be readily adopted by legal professionals and the judicial system) to replace "retrograde, unscientific, and discriminatory laws."

The recommendation also ruled out the possibility of retaining the laws of the Islamic Republic:

The uprising "arose from the way existing laws made their daily lives unbearable."

Given that the transition period could last up to three years, adopting the maintenance option would deprive the Iranian people of the sense of change they seek in their daily lives, potentially leading to collective discontent.

21. Furthermore, several laws (such as those discriminating against women, imposing the death penalty, mandatory corporal punishment, and restricting internet access) fundamentally contradict the idea of ​​a new era for the nation.

The solution is intended to be:

22.1. Practical:

This framework minimizes the workload of the transitional system, making it feasible to implement without overburdening the system's resources.

22.2. Stabilizing:

By ensuring the continuity of the Iranian people's daily affairs, the framework guarantees stability until new laws are adopted.

22.3. Promising:

"The repeal of certain laws associated with the Islamic Republic offers tangible evidence of progress, strengthening the nation's hope and confidence in the future."

The transition system guides them in the right direction.

The project makes no secret of its sources of inspiration: post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia, Iraq, and the United Kingdom throughout its history, including post-Brexit and even post-USSR.

The project includes a tripartite decree:

"35.1 Dissolution of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, as well as all (or a large part) of its institutions.

From a legal standpoint, this act officially establishes the transition system.

The system creates the necessary break with the old regime to gain international recognition and support.

35.2." Part Two: Announcement that, despite the dissolution of the Constitution, all existing laws—with the exception of those explicitly listed in Part Three (or announced subsequently)—will remain in force during the transition period to maintain national stability.

The Choice of Government System

This will be the subject of a three-month open campaign out of the four, with supporters of both systems addressing the public. The transitional government and the media are obligated to ensure the impartiality of public media (media access and airtime).

Nothing is said about private media.

The referendum will allow all eligible voters to participate, but, unless I am mistaken, the eligibility criteria and voting procedures are not defined.

Will an Iranian living abroad be able to vote from an embassy or consulate? Will they have to vote in person and/or in Iran? Following this referendum, a constituent assembly, elected by all eligible Iranians according to international standards, will draft a constitution corresponding to the chosen system (a process that will take between 6 and 12 months).

The constituent assembly will become the central body for everything concerning the future distribution of power between the executive (monarch or president) and a legislative branch, the heart of the parliamentary debate (one, two, or three chambers, with or without representation of regions, communities, and professions?), the mechanisms of oversight (limits placed on the monarch's rule in terms of duration, succession, abdication, and impeachment), the length of terms (for the President and/or members of Parliament), their renewal, and the existence or absence of independent bodies before which certain decisions of the monarch, or certain laws, that could infringe upon the fundamental rights of Iranians could be challenged.

The constituent assembly will benefit from the advice of a committee of experts and a committee of 7 legal experts that it will have appointed.

The drafts of this future constitution will be widely disseminated (article by article, as specified in the draft), their implications debated, and the whole submitted to the population, which will be able to reject two successive versions. A period of time naturally accompanies any potential revision by the Constituent Assembly (three months), with the assembly responsible for "taking into account public comments."

If the second draft is rejected by the Iranian people, a new Constituent Assembly will be elected.

Within two months of the constitutional vote, the transitional government must organize elections to the National Assembly (Mahestan).

The Constituent Assembly is adjourned until the monarch or president is chosen and sworn in. It dissolves upon this oath.

It is specified that:

if the system of government is a monarchy, the monarch is crowned within two months, and the prime minister and cabinet will be convened, thus ending the transitional government. If the system of government is a Republic, the transitional government will organize the presidential election at the same time as the parliamentary election.

- And if the Republic is presidential, the cabinet is appointed by the President and must be confirmed by Parliament.

The Mahestan (the transitional government) is therefore included in the new Iranian constitution, regardless of the system of government chosen.

The transitional government is dissolved in any case with the swearing-in of the cabinet.

The transition from the transitional government to an effective executive is framed, if not organized, by the draft constitution.

As a reminder, the monarchy itself can take several forms.

https://www.venice.coe.int/files/2012_03_29_mar/presentation_smith.pdf

A critical study of constitutional monarchies in democracies, now somewhat dated but still worth sharing (excerpts below), states:

"The possibility of drawing a link between 'monarchy' and 'democracy' therefore necessarily involves that of 'constitutional monarchy.'"

In its most basic sense, it means first that the monarchical institution is defined by the constitution. Second, it indicates that the powers of the constitution are limited in that the powers it confers are distributed among different

constituted bodies, which exercise them either jointly with one or another of these bodies

(typically: the legislative power) or, in principle, isolated from the constitutional framework

(typically: the power to administer justice).

To this would be added certain limits to any constituted power, particularly with regard to human rights…

During debates concerning the status of constitutional monarchies, the concept of

"parliamentary monarchy" sometimes arises; indeed, Article 1 of the Moroccan Constitution declares that the country is

"a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary, and social monarchy."

However, this concept has little precise meaning that is likely to be universally accepted.

As a demonstration, it suffices to recall that "parliamentary" regimes, pure and simple,

are also quite different from one another.

The minimal meaning of the expression "parliamentary regime" says little more than that

at least one component of the executive branch—the "government"—must be accountable to

parliament. However, the scope, forms, and implementation of this accountability vary…

During periods of transition, sometimes lengthy, such as every still-existing constitutional monarchy has experienced sooner or later in its history, the monarchical institution can indeed play a crucial role in ensuring the stability of the state and maintaining political and social development on a path acceptable to, or even, preferably, desired by the majority.

As soon as the ideology of popular sovereignty, in all its majesty, is accepted as the foundation of the entire constitutional framework, it seems evident that the work of the constitutional monarch is also necessarily carried out under the scrutiny of public opinion.

Two certainties about the democratic monarchy envisioned by the project for the prosperity of Iran:

It is not elective—the coronation immediately following the choice of a monarchical system does not involve any call for applications from existing monarchies or kings seeking a kingdom.

Nor is it a matter of divine right, since the project enshrines in its fourth fundamental principle the separation of religion and state.

The usefulness of this reminder lies in the mechanisms for protecting the person of the monarch—he is not sacred—and attacking him does not constitute a resurgence of the "enemy of God" offense so dear to the leader. His person will be protected against any attack on a head of state in accordance with the applicable law, with a graduated scale of offenses and penalties.

The precedents set by the Moroccan monarchy, not to mention the Gulf monarchies, should draw attention to the interplay between protecting the person of the king and protecting freedom of expression (the 10th fundamental principle).

- Two of the comments gathered emphasize the silence surrounding the diversity of Iran's regions and populations.

The constitution should address the place of these regions through the choice of the system of government, and especially its form and the powers assigned to all or part of parliament.

The eighth fundamental principle, "Equality of citizens before the law," touches on this issue without resolving it and is combined with a more enigmatic principle, the sixth, "Building of institutions and the centrality of the system."

In fact, the draft text only addresses this point very indirectly:

/either through genuine reflection on the restructuring of educational institutions, infrastructure, and content, taking into account the issue of equal rights and access to fundamental knowledge (the need for trained teachers and schools worthy of the name) free from restrictions. related to religion (particularly the separation of girls and boys), as well as language, in all regions, including the most remote and those most mistreated by the regime (discriminated against).

Or on water policy (including in the so-called remote areas of Sistan and Balochistan).

/or incidentally in terms of security

Separatist and ethno-sectarian threats

in border regions

The new army must enforce a doctrine of territorial integrity while

defending inclusive justice and equal civil rights;

a firm but

strategic response to any separatist activity.

In summary, the validity of the criticism will largely depend on the content of the constitution.

In the meantime, the rare public indicators, independently of the clues inherent to either a monarchical or Jacobin vision of the Republic, are the assertions of the shah's son during the October 2025 interview in particular:

"Q When you consider a possible uprising, how do you assess the relative importance of factors like economic deprivation, desire for democracy, desire for more just day-to-day social freedom, and something you mentioned in passing, ethnic tensions—the non-Persian elements of Iran, the Turkic, the Azeri, the other populations, the other minorities that may feel aggravated. How do you see the various drivers of a potential uprising being assessed?

PAHLAVI: Well, again, a lot of what we have seen in recent years, gathering of Iranians around Cyrus the Great's tomb in Pasargadae, all the way to the Mahsa Amini uprising, and basically the slogans that have been used or chanted in Iran as early as last week—I mean, as late as last week, and throughout these years, is all pointing to a collective national, if you will, slogan. And they keep saying, you know, from Zahedan to, I don't know, the other side of the country, our life is dedicated to this cause of liberation. We get our country back. The country getting back is for all of them, whether you are from Baluchistan, or from Kurdistan, or from Azerbaijan. It transcends anything that would otherwise be considered.

Now, is this sectarian or is it national? You know, Iranians have always felt as part of that country, for centuries. We never had these issues, that this regime has created, before the revolution. Nobody would walk the street and say, oh, this guy is Muslim, this guy is Jewish, this guy is Baha'i, or so on or so forth. Our national team was comprised of representatives of various faiths and religions. It was our national team. Everybody was Iranian—Iranian Kurd, Iranian Azeri, Iranian Jew, Iranian Zoroastrian, and so on and so forth. And I think the same spirit of our national identity binds us all together. So I'm very comfortable and very confident that the minute all those who were disenfranchised—and, yes, the regime was the cause for discrimination, whether it was ethnic discrimination, sexual discrimination, religious discrimination, or any other type of discrimination—that they will find again in that future the fact that nobody will ever feel unequal next to somebody else.

And that's the whole spirit that gels them together. And they understand that they have to pitch in and contribute. They cannot just sit back and expect it to be handed to them on a silver platter. Kennedy once said, ask not what your country can do for you, but what you could do for your country. And what you can do for your country right now is the basis of incentive that brings the people together. They find each other. They respond to one another. They sing together. The slogans are coordinated. And it's very representative and very diverse. So that's one thing. And I think ultimately the course is—you know, I always—and that's the reason for IPP, Iran Prosperity Project. What is the roadmap to recovery? What are the immediate issues that we need to tackle to make sure that first of all, the transition is stable, that the economy will be stable, that will have elements that consider all these factors—short term, mid-term, and ultimately long term.

That's what really is the tangible elements for people to understand in what way they can benefit from this change. Because liberty, human rights, and democracies, as we would say here, motherhood and apple pie, but does it put food on the table? And if we explain how, and the country can get restarted, and what are the preconditions, then I think the average person, particularly those who are most affected in areas that has been the most impoverished—Baluchistan is one, Kurdistan is one—will understand how they will benefit as a result. So rather than being in a sense of resisting change, they know that they cannot get anything worse than what it is right now. And there's light at the end of the tunnel. But it requires collective participation…

The choice of fate for the leaders and institutions of the Islamic Republic

-Furthermore, the referendum on the choice of the system of government is coupled with the referendum on the fate of the leaders of the Islamic Republic.

The choice is binary—at a minimum—but could include other options according to the text:

/punishment at the end of a public, fair trial respecting the rights of the defense and international standards, with, in addition to reparations for victims, (Truth Commission) with the dual purpose of "preventing acts of revenge" and "ensuring deterrence."

/national amnesty "in order to accelerate the transition process."

This aspect is all the more sensitive as the transition is accompanied by a promise of justice for the victims guilty of the atrocities committed over 47 years.

The draft nevertheless attempts several distinctions:

/ public prosecution for criminal offenses (crimes of blood but also corruption and embezzlement) by the authorities of the new Divan for offenses committed before the fall of the regime;

/the rights of victims, which are not clearly defined as being purely compensatory under civil law (reparation for damages suffered as a result of executions, torture, deaths, etc.);

Or, assuming the referendum rejects the option of punishment, whether they can still initiate legal proceedings in Iran, or before international or national courts abroad.

Uncertainty, if not outright confusion, increases when one examines the section of the draft law devoted to the rule of law and key organizations of the Islamic Republic.

In essence, the draft law adopts, if not recommends, "hybrid" solutions that acknowledge the disappearance of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its constitutional framework, its instruments of religious oppression, and its repressive apparatus, while exceptionally maintaining the texts necessary for the continuity of individual rights of Iranians, governed by provisions relating to their civil status and their property, for example.

Exceptions to the exception exist, notably when privileges and/or assets have been acquired precisely at the expense of the legitimate rights of Iranian citizens (water rights, for example).

But complexity lies in the details…

Regarding 'key organizations,' the project attempts to categorize the organizations and/or individuals within them, between sanctioning individual behaviors that constitute direct violations of the fundamental rights of individuals denounced, arrested, or detained, and carrying out legitimate administrative or management tasks, as well as acts of control or combating ordinary crime.

This is followed by a very lengthy review of the armed forces and specialized police units based on a common principle:

"The complete elimination of religious, sectarian, and revolutionary influence within the army, police, and security institutions."

—And Table VII. Structural assessment of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations lists the fate of agencies on an organization-by-organization basis.

• Dissolution of the Quds Force, the Supreme Military Affairs Office of the Leader, the BASIJ intelligence/neighborhood informants, and the BASIJ organization (used for internal repression, ideological control, cyber operations, and proxy recruitment), the Morality Police (Gashte), and Ershad, for example.

• Dismantling of the "repressive component" of organizations such as FARAJA and NOPO special operations.

• Elimination/removal/dismissal of only the "high-ranking officials" within the hierarchy overseeing these entities…

The focus appears to be both on refocusing missions on the administrative or civilian service of the State and on preserving/recycling the apparatus not directly implicated in repression within the framework of a new security doctrine.

4. Maintaining Structures

Traffic Police (Rahvar) – road traffic control, Public Security Police (PAVA), Immigration and Passport Police, Anti-Narcotics Police

5. Mixed Solutions: "Withdrawal of ideological forces" + incorporation into

The army or a reconfigured police force.

Artesh and the Transitional National Guard operate under civilian command.

In this context, the counter-espionage unit of the Revolutionary Guard is dissolved but would be integrated into the army.

Similar approaches were recently attempted in Syria, with a number of undesirable consequences, particularly when units dominated by an ideology predating their integration into the "regular" forces (aligned with the new President) were stationed in areas where ethnic or religious minorities feared abuses, or even acts of collective revenge or predation because they were presumed to be "enemies." And these abuses did indeed occur, even though commissions of inquiry were established to punish the perpetrators.

The general rule would be:

"A total ban on political, partisan, or propaganda activities carried out by the armed forces and intelligence services."

But this is not enough.

It's important to remember that the project relies in part on a previous policy of rallying former members of the system (civil servants and bureaucrats), former army officers whose loyalty to the Shah's son could replace loyalty to the regime.

"And of course, the Iranian people have the right to seek justice. And they will have their day in court. And those responsible will have to answer for their crimes.

But the majority of these people who are not part of this top echelon of the regime that benefits from these arrangements—it's a mafia that's just sucking the blood out of Iran, and its resources."

Once they're out, those are the people who stand to face the music. Would they rather stand with the sinking ship, or do they think that this is the moment now to join with the resistance and the movement of liberation? And we are providing them an option, so they are not in no-man's land.

That also depends on how the world responds to this phenomenon, because you cannot, on the one hand, ask people to defect and for people to rise if the world is still trying to negotiate yet another deal with this regime, or push back or postpone this opportunity"

-the project integrates more or less implicitly, via the education of the youngest, and the professional training of the oldest, a program comparable to denazification or de-Stalinization or closer to deradicalization.

These processes, and sometimes these trials, are relatively lengthy and carry significant symbolic weight, particularly concerning high-ranking officials and those who give the orders.

I note that the project remains, unless I have misinterpreted it, purely national in this respect, even though coordination with all UN (including the IAEA) and European bodies is addressed in the diplomatic and foreign policy section of the project.

/USA, Germany, Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Israel, with regard to the "Western" states

/China and Russia

/Neighboring countries: Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, GCC

With regional approaches:

/The Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula

/The Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan)

/Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia)

The project also incorporates the Truth and Justice Commission mechanism, under the supervision of the Judiciary.

These commissions have taken various forms since the one established in post-apartheid South Africa.

Chile and Rwanda have had forms specific to their situations (post-repression and disappearances or post-genocide), as have, more recently, Gambia, Peru, and Sierra Leone.

Amnesty International analyzed these tools some time ago – but the study is a bit dated (2007) – and the United Nations has compiled a more comprehensive assessment: https://www.un.org/french/pubs/chronique/2004/numero4/0404p19.html

Personally, I support them in principle.

However, experience shows that the objectives and methods must be particularly clear to avoid being misleading.

Being heard, identifying the perpetrator and the victim, exposing lies, identifying propaganda…

This very useful, even sometimes essential, mechanism at the community level does not, however, resolve all traumas, will sometimes not provide all the answers for victims and their families, and cannot absorb all suffering.

But it names the suffering, it makes it visible.

But I share the concerns of the initial commentators regarding the Judiciary.

The so-called Transitional Council is headed by a respected individual (all the better), preferably a judge (even better), appointed by an absolute majority vote of the Uprising Council with the approval of the Uprising Leader.

While this director temporarily holds the power to appoint and dismiss Iran's highest judges—a heavy responsibility given the involvement of a previously identified list of these high-ranking judges in organizing the repression and extrajudicial killings of protesters—a five-member Judicial Council, chosen for their competence and professional qualifications, is stipulated to oversee the appointment and dismissal of judges at the regional level.

BUT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH IS ONLY ISSUED THROUGH THE BUDGETARY ASPECT

Another respected figure has been chosen to head the truth commission tasked, if the referendum opts for a public trial of the former leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with collecting, documenting, and verifying evidence of crimes committed against the Iranian people, including the embezzlement of public funds. This commission will then compile a preliminary report for the head of the Divan and a final report for the Council of the Uprising, with the final report being submitted to the Attorney General to initiate the public proceedings and disseminated to the public.

It is not specified whether this commission could be tasked with examining the potential conditions and criteria for the "national amnesty" option should the referendum favor it.

No specific procedures are planned for the transition from the Divan to the Divan itself, regardless of the end of the transition period.

The future constitution could contain the elements necessary to establish the independence of the judiciary according to international criteria, but the draft remains silent on this point.

Isabelle Prat, PhD in Law, FEMO Collaborator

[1] I do not have sufficient knowledge of the Iranian constitution and its electoral code to identify the specific requirements of such a foundation and their potential adaptability to the transition.