Yemen: A forgotten war, multiple conflicts – regional issues and prospects for peace
By Jean-François Legaret – Nader Nouri - August 22, 2025
For over a decade, Yemen has been the scene of a complex conflict, a tangle of internal divisions, regional rivalries, and global geostrategic stakes. While the news focuses primarily on the Houthi maritime attacks in the Red Sea, this war is above all a conflict in a fragmented country, where the population is experiencing one of the worst contemporary humanitarian crises.
To understand the current situation, it is necessary to revisit Yemen's recent history, analyze its internal divisions, and assess the extent of external interference.
Unification and Disillusionment (1990–1994)
On May 22, 1990, North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) merged to form the Republic of Yemen. Ali Abdullah Saleh became president and Ali Salim al-Beidh vice-president. A unitary constitution was adopted in 1991, enshrining multiparty democracy, free elections, and respect for fundamental rights. Parliament, elected in 1993, reflected the north-south divide: of 301 seats, 159 went to the North, 111 to the South, and 31 were appointed by the president of the presidential council.
But unity was fragile. The economic deficit of 1991 plunged the country into a severe crisis that exacerbated political rivalries and tribal reprisals. In 1994, tensions erupted into civil war: the South proclaimed its independence but was quickly recaptured by northern forces. Saleh became president following a controversial parliamentary referendum.
Tribalism, Sectarianism, and the Emergence of Uprisings (1994–2011)
After the war, Yemen remained a failed state. The tribes, the true socio-political pillars, exerted an influence parallel to the central state, particularly the Hashid and Bakil confederations in the north. Southern resentment crystallized around a feeling of economic and political exclusion, fueled by the omnipresence of northern power.
Religiously, the population is predominantly Sunni Shafi'i, but approximately 30% of Yemenis are Zaydi Shiites, especially in the northern mountains. This long-dormant divide became a defining characteristic of Yemeni identity in the 2000s, with the spread of Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia and the rise of the Houthis, a Zaydi movement with religious and political demands.
The first Houthi rebellions erupted as early as 2004. For six successive episodes, until 2010, the government attempted to subdue them by force, in vain, despite violent repression and discreet Iranian support for the insurgents.
The Arab Spring, the Failed Transition, and the Fall of the State (2011–2014)
In January 2011, following the example of the uprisings that shook Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen entered the wave of the Arab Spring. The demonstrations, initially led by students and human rights activists, quickly spread to major cities, notably Sana'a, Taiz, and Aden. The demands were clear: an end to corruption, improved living conditions, respect for civil liberties, and the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power for over three decades.
Popular discontent was fueled by several structural factors. The country is one of the poorest in the Arab world, with a GDP per capita of less than $1,500, an estimated unemployment rate of 35%, and a severe dependence on food imports. Analyst Ginny Hill, a Yemen specialist at Chatham House, sums up the situation by stating that "extreme poverty and poor governance have created fertile ground for popular anger."
While Saleh initially retained the support of some tribal elites, these alliances quickly fractured. In March 2011, the bloody crackdown on protests in Sana'a—known as the "Friday of Dignity Massacre," which left more than 50 dead—provoked a decisive shift. Powerful tribal figures, such as Sheikh Sadeq al-Ahmar of the Hashid confederation, withdrew their support from the president. The army itself became divided, with some commanders joining the protesters.
Faced with escalating violence and under pressure from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an agreement was negotiated under the auspices of the UN. In November 2011, Saleh agreed to cede power to his vice-president, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in exchange for legal immunity. The transition officially began in February 2012, following a single-candidate presidential election that confirmed Hadi as head of state.
However, this transition, intended to last two years and lead to a new constitution,is facing numerous obstacles. The National Dialogue Conference (2013–2014), bringing together political parties, tribal representatives, youth, and women, is struggling to reach a consensus on key issues such as the federal structure of the state, resource sharing, and military reform. The South, already wary, overwhelmingly rejects proposals to divide the country into six regions, which it considers detrimental to its interests.
Meanwhile, the Houthis are exploiting this institutional vacuum. Taking advantage of popular discontent in the North and the partial withdrawal of the army, they are extending their area of influence far beyond their stronghold of Saada. Tensions with the Hadi government are escalating, and fighting is erupting sporadically in several provinces.
In September 2014, amidst a political deadlock and an economic crisis, exacerbated by the elimination of fuel subsidies, the Houthis march on Sana'a. Within days, they seized control of government buildings and forced Hadi to sign a power-sharing agreement that, in effect, cemented their dominance over the capital. This episode marked the effective collapse of the central government's authority and paved the way for the regional and international phases of the conflict.
Regional Escalation and Fragmented Warfare (2014–2025)
The year 2015 marked a turning point in the Yemeni conflict. After capturing Sana'a in the fall of 2014, the Houthis rapidly consolidated their hold on the north of the country. In January 2015, their forces seized the presidential palace, forcing President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi to flee first to Aden, then into exile in Saudi Arabia. This collapse of central power opened the door to an unprecedented foreign intervention.
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia, fearing the emergence of an armed movement allied with Iran on its southern border, launched Operation Decisive Storm. Led by Riyadh and supported by a coalition of Arab countries (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan), the operation also benefited from logistical, intelligence, and arms support from Western powers, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The stated objective was clear: to restore the UN-recognized government and repel the Houthi advance.
However, this intervention transformed the internal conflict into a multi-faceted regional war. Far from being crushed by the air campaign, the Houthis adapted. Strengthened by their local roots and Iranian material and political support, they maintained control of the north, including the capital. The coalition airstrikes, often inaccurate, are causing significant civilian casualties, fueling popular resentment against Riyadh and indirectly bolstering the insurgents' legitimacy.
In the south, the situation is becoming even more complicated. The separatists of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), initially allied with the Hadi government against the Houthis, are gradually gaining independence. Supported by the United Arab Emirates, they are seizing control of several strategic cities, including Aden, which they consider the capital of a future southern state. Tensions between the STC and the recognized government sometimes escalate into armed clashes, opening a new internal front.
Meanwhile, the security vacuum left by the collapse of the state is benefiting jihadist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), already established in the east of the country, is consolidating its strongholds in the provinces of Abyan and Shabwah. ISIS, although less influential, is managing to carry out spectacular attacks, particularly against military and Shiite targets. These groups are thriving in areas beyond any state control, exploiting poverty and local rivalries to recruit.
Beginning on October 7, 2023, the conflict took on a new international dimension. Amid a broader regional escalation, the Houthis began launching attacks against commercial and military vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, notably using ballistic missiles and drones of Iranian origin. These attacks, sometimes targeting ships linked to Israeli or Western interests, severely disrupted global maritime trade and prompted a swift response from an international naval coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom. This coalition conducted several airstrikes and cruise missile attacks against Houthi positions in Yemen, targeting weapons depots, launch systems, and command infrastructure.
These developments added a maritime front to the land conflict, increasing military pressure on the Houthis and also raising their profile on the international stage. Over the years, the conflict has morphed into a mosaic of interconnected wars: a war of attrition between the Houthis and the coalition, political rivalries between the government and the separatists, a struggle for territorial control between rival tribes, and an asymmetric war against extremist groups. Each external actor pursues its own strategic objectives: Saudi Arabia seeks to secure its border, the United Arab Emirates aims to control maritime routes and ports, the Iranian mullahs use the Houthis as a geopolitical lever, while Western powers focus their airstrikes on counterterrorism and protecting trade routes.
This fragmentation of the country has directly resulted in the collapse of institutions, the worsening of the humanitarian crisis, and the proliferation of front lines, making any prospect of a comprehensive peace even more complex. As Yemeni analyst Nadwa al-Dawsari summarized in 2022: "Yemen is no longer a single conflict." It is a patchwork of local wars, each fueled by external agendas.
The Exacerbation of Regional Rivalries
Over the past decade, Yemen has emerged as one of the main arenas for the strategic rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This indirect confrontation is part of a broader struggle for influence that extends far beyond Yemen's borders to encompass the entire Arabian Peninsula and parts of the Middle East.
For Tehran, supporting the Houthis serves several purposes. Officially, the Islamic Republic claims to support a movement for "self-determination" in the face of what it considers foreign aggression. In reality, the Houthis represent a profound strategic opportunity for Iran:
On the one hand, their control of part of the Red Sea coastline allows them to influence the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a maritime passage through which nearly 10% of global trade and approximately 6.2 million barrels of oil per day transit, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA).
On the other hand, by supporting this movement, Tehran is extending its Shiite "arc of resistance," already present in Lebanon via Hezbollah, in Syria, and in Iraq, and thus strengthening its ability to exert pressure on its regional adversaries and on international maritime traffic.
For Riyadh, the prospect ofa "Yemeni Hezbollah" emerging on its southern border is unacceptable. Such a situation would constitute not only a direct military threat but also an internal political challenge, risking inspiring or supporting the Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, home to significant oil facilities. The Yemeni conflict has thus become, for the kingdom, a war of prevention as much as a war of influence, aimed at preventing the consolidation of a lasting pro-Iranian armed force on the doorstep of the Gulf.
This rivalry is not new, but it has taken on unprecedented intensity since 2015, when the Saudi intervention began. Iran, while denying any direct role at the start of the conflict, has progressively increased its support for the Houthis, notably through the provision of ballistic missiles, armed drones, and tactical training. The United Nations has repeatedly documented the presence of Iranian-made weapons in Houthi arsenals, in violation of Security Council resolutions.
Federalism: A Failed Project
Before the outbreak of open warfare, the National Dialogue Conference (March 2013 – January 2014), conceived as the cornerstone of the post-Saleh transition, attempted to offer a political solution to the country's divisions. Among its key proposals was the establishment of a federal state with six regions, each endowed with broad administrative and economic autonomy. This structure was intended to reconcile national unity with regional aspirations by providing the South, North, and East with levers of local governance.
On paper, this formula appealed to international partners, who saw it as a way to pacify tribal tensions and contain separatist aspirations. In practice, it faced fierce opposition from several Yemeni forces.
Southern separatists denounced the division of the South into two separate regions, seeing it as a maneuver to dilute their political influence and weaken any claim to independence.
The Zaydis of Azal, a northern region partly controlled by the Houthis, believed that this division would deprive them of natural resources and access to the sea, exacerbating their economic marginalization.
According to Yemeni analyst Abdelghani al-Iryani, "the federal map of six regions crystallized existing frustrations instead of alleviating them. It was perceived as a project imposed from the outside, serving certain interests rather than a national consensus."
This widespread rejection stripped the proposal of its political legitimacy.Quickly abandoned, the federalism project left an institutional vacuum that the Houthis exploited to justify their advance on Sana'a in 2014. The prospect of a meaningful political compromise then faded behind the rise of military power and the escalation of foreign interference.
An abysmal humanitarian crisis
Ten years of war have made Yemen the epicenter of one of the worst contemporary humanitarian catastrophes. The price paid by civilians is appalling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations' Global Conflict Tracker, and based on United Nations estimates, between 2015 and early 2022, 377,000 people lost their lives, approximately 60% of them indirectly: not on the battlefields, but due to hunger, preventable diseases, or lack of access to healthcare. This distinction underscores the scale of the conflict's collateral damage, where the maritime blockade, the destruction of infrastructure, and the collapse of the healthcare system kill far more people than bullets and bombs.
In 2025, the situation remains alarming. More than 19 million Yemenis, nearly two-thirds of the estimated 32 million population, depend on humanitarian aid for their survival. Among them, 1.2 million children suffer from acute malnutrition, a condition that directly threatens their lives if not treated promptly (AP News). UNICEF estimates that 12 million children lack regular access to clean water, sufficient food, or basic healthcare.
Hospitals, when not completely destroyed, often operate with reduced staff and without adequate medical equipment. In some rural areas, people must travel dozens of kilometers to find a still-functioning health center. Vaccination campaigns are regularly disrupted by fighting, leading to the resurgence of diseases thought to have been eradicated, such as diphtheria and polio.
At the extremes of this suffering, testimonies gathered by NGOs and journalists put a face to the statistics. On the coast, families displaced by the fighting survive on a single daily meal of "bread and tea," as reported by The Guardian. These families often live in makeshift shelters made of tarpaulins and corrugated iron, exposed to the elements and the oppressive heat, with no tangible hope of returning to their destroyed villages.
The humanitarian crisis is compounded by a tragic migration phenomenon. Despite the war, Yemen remains a transit country for tens of thousands of migrants and refugees from the Horn of Africa—Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea—who hope to reach the Gulf states. These crossings are made aboard overcrowded and unsafe boats, in inhumane conditions. Recently, a shipwreck in the Gulf of Aden resulted in at least 56 deaths and 132 missing persons (AP News). This tragedy illustrates the perilous nature of this maritime route, one of the deadliest in the world according to the International Organization for Migration.
In this context, humanitarian organizations, though essential, are facing a gradual withdrawal of international donors. Humanitarian funding is declining even as needs increase. This decrease in resources forces agencies to reduce food rations and assistance programs, leaving millions of Yemenis in even more extreme poverty. As a World Food Programme report summarizes: "In Yemen, hunger is not the result of a lack of food in the world, but of a lack of political will and the means to access it." »
For a realistic way out of the crisis: paths and conditions
Several scenarios deserve to be examined according to realistic criteria:
The status quo remains unchanged: fragmentation persists, the state fails to re-emerge, and regions sink into de facto autonomy.
International mediation, led by the UN and neighboring countries such as Oman or Qatar, could allow for a lasting ceasefire, provided there is a minimal agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Federalism, despite its past failures, remains a viable alternative if the division is rethought equitably. Despite criticism, experts such as Dr. Olfat Al-Dubai consider it "the only viable option for a new government in Yemen."
Partition, although risky, is sometimes mentioned as a radical solution: it implies the creation of two separate states, North and South, with redrawn borders.
In any case, a prerequisite for any lasting solution will be the end of Iranian interference in Yemen, which is one of the main factors fueling the conflict and a major obstacle to regional stability.
Each of these options presupposes a strong international commitment, but the essential point is that the effort be guided by active neutrality. This means placing the needs of the Yemeni people at the center, respecting religious and tribal identities, and prioritizing reconstruction over imposition.
Yemen is not only an epicenter of conflict; it reflects governance failures, regional interference, and, above all, immense human suffering. A sustainable strategy will require both humility and pragmatism: recognizing the various internal balances, encouraging dialogue with all local actors, strengthening civilian capacities, and placing the dignity of Yemenis at the heart of the peace effort.
Jean-François Legaret is President of FEMO.
Nader Nouri is a former Iranian diplomat based in Paris and Secretary General of FEMO..